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Note
Romer v. Evans: A Positive Portent of the Future
I.

INTRODUCTION

The mission of COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES is to proactively lead and assist those opposing the militant homosexual
attack on traditional values; to act as a resource equipping grassroots efforts through education and training of like-minded
organizations and individuals across America dedicated to
preserving the fundamental freedoms of speech, association,
assembly, belief and conscience protected by Colorado's
Amendment Two; to preserve the right to disagree with and
resist, in a civil and compassionate manner, the forced
affirmation of the homosexual lifestyle.'

So began the battle in Colorado to pass an amendment to the
Colorado State Constitution-Amendment 2 (the "Amendment"). 2
Ultimately passed on November 3, 1992, Amendment 2 revoked the
existing prohibitions against discrimination based upon sexual
orientation.3 Amendment 2 also forbade the reinstatement of any law
which granted specific legal protections to homosexuals. 4 Moreover,
Amendment 2 barred homosexuals from redressing the law, short of
another constitutional amendment.5
"Colorado for Family Values" ("CFV"), a conservative Christian
organization in Colorado, initiated and promoted Amendment 26 in
1. Stephanie L. Grauerholz, Comment, Colorado's Amendment 2 Defeated: The
Emergence of a Fundamental Right to Participate in the PoliticalProcess, 44 DEPAUL L.
REV. 841,

847 n.48 (citing

COLORADO FOR FAMILY VALUES, AMENDMENT 2 & BEYOND

(1993)).
2. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (West Supp. 1996) (historical notes) (held
unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)).
3. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1623 (1996) [hereinafter Romer IIl].
4. Id. at 1625. The Court noted that Amendment 2 prohibited all municipalities, as
well as the Colorado State legislature itself, from enacting any protections based on
sexual orientation. Id. at 1627.
5. Id. The majority opinion stated, "[homosexuals] can obtain specific protection
against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state
constitution." Id.
6. Dirk Johnson, I Don't Hate Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at 24.
Colorado for Family Values ("CFV") started Amendment 2 as part of their organization's
mission to combat homosexuality at every opportunity. See, e.g., Grauerholz, supra
note 1, at 846-47.
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response to a few Colorado municipalities that enacted laws barring
discrimination based on sexual orientation.7 After launching an
extensive campaign to combat what they termed the "militant
homosexual attack on traditional values," 8 CFV ultimately succeeded
in its mission. 9 The Colorado electorate passed Amendment 2,'o
which nullified the municipal anti-discrimination laws," by a fiftythree percent to forty-seven percent margin.'

7.

ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE

§

13-98 (1977); BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE

§§

12-1-1

to 12-1-11 (1987); DENVER, COLO. REV. MUN. CODE art. IV, §§ 28-91 to 28-116 (1991).
Aspen's ordinance prohibits discrimination in the areas of employment, housing and
public accommodations based on race, creed, color, religion, ancestry, national origin,
sex, age, marital or familial status, physical handicap, sexual orientation, or political
affiliation. ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE

§

13-98.

The Boulder ordinance prohibits religious institutions from refusing to hire someone
or restrict access to public accommodations or housing due to that person's race, creed,
color, gender, sexual orientation, marital or family status, pregnancy, national origin,
ancestry, age, or mental or physical disability. BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE

§

12-1-1 to

12-1-4. Section 12-1-1 defines "sexual orientation" as the "choice of sexual partners,
i.e. bisexual, homosexual or heterosexual." Id. Furthermore, the Boulder ordinance does
not permit the owner of an owner-occupied, one-family dwelling or duplex to deny
housing to an individual based on his or her sexual orientation. Id.
The Denver ordinance enacts many of the same policies as the other municipalities
except that the Denver version exempts religious institutions, thus allowing these
institutions to refuse to hire people or restrict access to public accommodations based
on an individual's sexual orientation. DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN. CODE art. IV

§

28-92

(1991). The Denver ordinance also exempts owners with rental spaces in their homes or
duplexes in which they reside. Id. This statute defines a person's sexual orientation as
their "status . . . as to his or her sexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality." Id.
8. See Grauerholz, supra note i, at 847.
9. Johnson, supra note 6, at 24. According to Johnson, Will Perkins, the founder
and chairman of CFV, spent $374,000 to promote Amendment 2. Id.
10. On November 3, 1992, the citizens of Colorado voted to adopt Colorado
Constitutional Amendment 2. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993)
[hereinafter, this Note refers to the Colorado Supreme Court decision as Evans 1(b) and
the trial court decision, Evans v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo.
Jan. 15, 1993), as Evans 1(a)].
11. Colorado Constitutional Amendment 2 stated:
No protected status based on homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, not
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b (held unconstitutional in Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629
(1996)).
12. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1272.
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Immediately after the Amendment's passage, the Evans plaintiffs 3
sought to enjoin Amendment 2'" and persuade the Colorado courts to
declare Amendment 2 unconstitutional. 5 In 1996, nearly four years6
after the passage of the Amendment, and countless legal battles later,'
Amendment 2 landed before the United States Supreme Court.' 7
Holding that Amendment 2 effectively withdrew specific legally
protected constitutional rights from homosexual Colorado citizens,
the Supreme Court invalidated Amendment 2.'9 This Note will
13. The plaintiffs included:
Richard G. Evans (gay man who worked for the city and county of Denver);
Angela Romero (lesbian employed as a police officer for the city and county of
Denver); Linda Fowler (lesbian employed as a contract administrator by a
private employer); Paul Brown (Colorado State employee and gay man); Jane
Doe (assumed name by lesbian employed by Jefferson county); Martina
Navratilova (lesbian pro tennis player who resides in Aspen); Bret Tanberg (a
heterosexual discriminated against because he suffers from Human
Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV"), and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS") based on the perception he is gay); Priscilla Inkpen (lesbian and an
ordained minister); John Miller (a gay Spanish Professor at the University of
Colorado); the Boulder School District RE-2; the city and county of Denver;
the city of Boulder; the city of Aspen; and the city council of Aspen.
Evans 1(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *1, aff'd on other grounds, Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993). See Grauerholz, supra note 1, at 845 n.31.
14. See Evans 1(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *12 (granting plaintiff's motion for
preliminary injunction). The plaintiffs wanted to prevent the enforcement of
Amendment 2, so on November 12, 1992, they filed a suit in the Denver district court to
enjoin Amendment 2 as unconstitutional. Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1272.
15. Evans 1(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *4-*5. The Colorado district court granted the
preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from declaring Amendment 2 in force,
but noted that it "may not at this time rule on the constitutionality of Amendment 2."
Id. at *7.The defendant appealed and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the injunction,
but altered the lower court's decision by deciding the case on other grounds. Evans l(b),
854 P.2d at 1282. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause
protects the fundamental right to participate equally in the political process. Id. The
Colorado Supreme Court also stated that a reviewing court should apply the strict
scrutiny standard to Amendment 2 because it expressly "fenc[ed] out" homosexuals, an
independently identifiable group, by infringing on the fundamental right. Id. See infra
Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of review.
The Colorado Supreme Court then remanded the case back to the Colorado District
Court to determine if Amendment 2 served any compelling state interest. Evans v.
Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 518586, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 1993) [hereinafter
Evans 11(a)]. After the trial court ruling, the case again made its way back to the
Colorado Supreme Court. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) [hereinafter
Evans 11(b)]. In each decision, the courts found that the state failed to prove that it
supported the Amendment with a narrowly tailored, compelling state interest. Id. at
1350.
16. See infra Part III for a discussion of the judicial history of the Evans cases.
17. Romer I1, 116 S.Ct. 1620 (1996).
18. Id. at 1629.
19. Id.
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examine the legal and factual issues that led up to Romer v. Evans and
will critically analyze the decision.
First, this Note discusses historical legislation against traditionally
scorned activities,2 ° and it then examines the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.2'
Specifically, the Note next addresses the standards of review
commonly employed by the Court to determine the constitutionality of
legislation like Colorado's Amendment 2.22 This Note also explores
the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to homosexuality 23 and
highlights cases relating specifically to the Fourteenth Amendment and
homosexual rights. 24 Next, this Note discusses the facts 25 of Romer
v. Evans26 and reviews the case's subsequent legal history. 27 This
Note then critically analyzes the decision, arguing that the majority
opinion, despite weaknesses in the rationale, was correct in
principle.28 Furthermore, this Note attacks the dissent by illustrating
the weaknesses in that opinion. 29 Finally, this Note suggests that by
providing pro-homosexual rights advocates with a favorable decision,
the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans will help future prohomosexual rights advocates advance their cause.30
II.BACKGROUND
A. The Constitutionalityof Laws Prohibiting
TraditionallyScorned Activities
Since the late 1800s, the United States Supreme Court has examined
and upheld the constitutionality of laws that placed an outright ban on
"social[ly] harm[ful]" activities 3' such as polygamy. In recent years,
however, the Court has overruled many of these holdings by removing
a variety of (but not all) punitive actions associated with the socially

20.
2 1.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
3 1.

See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part lI.B.
See infra Part II.B.I-3.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.B.-D.
Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
See infra Part III.C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part V.
Romer IH, 116 S. Ct. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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harmful behavior.32 Today, the Court will most likely refuse to
disenfranchise people merely because of their status.33
In the 1800s, the Court began its attack on socially harmful behavior
by targeting polygamy.34 In Davis v. Beason, a local government
indicted a plaintiff for lying during his oath to become a registered
elector.35 Under oath, the plaintiff swore that he did not practice or
advise in favor of polygamy.36 In actuality, the plaintiff practiced
Mormonism, a religion which taught, advised, counseled, and
encouraged its members to commit bigamy and polygamy.37
In delivering the majority opinion, the Court decried the horrors of
polygamy. 38 The majority suggested that polygamy destroyed
society's fabric and that such a deleterious activity deserved
punishment as much as any other crime. 39 The Supreme Court refused
32. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). The First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a state to pass laws criminalizing "advocacy" of
violence. Id. at 449. Rather, only conduct that "incite[s] ... imminent lawless action"
can be condemned. Id.
33. Romer Il1, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337
(1972)).
34. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, (1890), rev'd in part, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
35. Id. The oath read in pertinent part:
I do swear (or affirm) that I ... am not a bigamist or polygamist; that I am not
a member of any order, organization or association which teaches, advises,
counsels or encourages its members, devotees or any other person to commit
the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law, as a duty
arising or resulting from membership in such order, organization or
association or which practises bigamy, polygamy or plural celestial marriage
as a doctrinal rite of such organization; that I do not and will not, publicly or
privately, or in any manner whatever teach, advise, counsel or encourage any
person to commit the crime of bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime
defined by law, either as a religious duty or otherwise....
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 334-35.
38. Id. at 341.
39. Id. at 342. Justice Field deplored the evocation of religion to classify polygamy.
Id. The Justice noted that the Framers did not intend to create the freedom to worship
right to allow heinous and horrible crimes like polygamy. Id. Furthermore, the Justice
contended that limits exist as to religious freedom and action in the name of religion.
Id. at 343. Specifically, the Justice stated, "IThe [free] exercise of religion ... must be
subordinate to the criminal laws of the country." Id. at 342-43. Justice Field cited
Justice Matthews in another case, noting:
Certainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to take rank as one
of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks to establish it on
the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the
union for life of one man and one woman in the holy state of matrimony; the
sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best
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to classify polygamy as an act of religious freedom4 and, instead,
fortified the position that polygamy constituted a crime. 4" Further, the
Court held the anti-polygamy laws valid because they did not
discriminate against Mormons or any group in particular, but merely
discriminated against the act of polygamy and its advocation.42 As a
result, the Supreme Court declared the Idaho law prohibiting
polygamy in perfect congruence with the laws of the Constitution. 43
Today, Davis is largely viewed as outdated law, 44 even though the
Supreme Court still relies on Davis to some extent.45 Specifically, a
government may no longer deny the right to vote or punish people
who merely advocate distasteful behavior.' For example, the Court in

guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent
progress in social and political improvement.
Id. at 344-45 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1880) (Matthews, J.)).
40. Justice Field noted, "[tlo permit [polygamy] would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every
citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such
circumstances." Id.
41. Id. at 343.
42. Id. at 344. The opinion stated, "[laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with
practices." Id.
43. id. at 346. The Supreme Court stated that Idaho possessed the power to prescribe
any reasonable qualifications of voters and for holding office, not inconsistent with the
limitations set forth in the following paragraph, summarized by the Court from sections
1851 and 1859 of the Idaho Revised Statutes:
First, that the right of suffrage and of holding office shall be exercised only by
citizens of the United States and above the age of 21 or persons above that age
who have declared their intention to become such citizens; second, that the
elective franchise or the right of holding office shall not be denied to any
citizen on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; third, that
no soldier or sailor or other person in the army or navy, or attached to troops
in the service of the United States, shall be allowed to vote unless he has made
his permanent domicile in the territory for six months; and fourth, that no
person belonging to the army or navy shall be elected to or hold a civil office
or appointment in the territory.
Davis, 133 U.S. at 346 (quoting IDAHO REV. STAT. §§ 1851, 1859).

44. See Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (commenting that "[t]o the extent that Davis
held that persons advocating a certain practice may be denied the right to vote, it is no
longer good law"). Justice Scalia briefly mentioned Davis when he wrote, "[t]o the
extent, if any, that this opinion permits the imposition of adverse consequences upon
mere abstract advocacy of polygamy, it has of course been overruled by later cases." Id.
at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
45. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535
(1993) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), and noting that the negative
effect of legislation on a particular group does not automatically invalidate the
legislation nor imply that the legislature impermissibly targeted the specific group).
46. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
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Brandenburgv. Ohio47 struck down a law which punished a Ku Klux
Klan leader for syndicalism.48 Reporters had tape recorded the
defendant and others making hate speeches and threatening violence if
the "President, our Congress, [and] our Supreme Court continue[d] to
suppress the white, Caucasian race. '49 The defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the syndicalism statute under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.5
Declining to follow prior United States Supreme Court cases that
upheld the constitutionality of syndicalism laws, 5' the Brandenburg
Court invalidated the syndicalism statute. 52 According to the Court,
the statute purported to punish mere advocacy and forbade, through
criminal penalty, the assembly of people with common views.5 3
Significantly, the Court refused to uphold laws which penalized people
who followed and preached certain socially distasteful practices.'
Yet, despite its holding in Brandenburg,the Court again revisited
the topic of socially distasteful sexual behavior in 1986. 55 This time
the Court targeted sodomy.56 In Bowers v. Hardwick,57 the United
States Supreme Court examined a Georgia law which criminalized
sodomy and other types of intercourse, regardless of sexual
47. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
48. Id. at 444-45. The actual charge under the Ohio statute, included, "advocat[ing]..
the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform . . .[for] voluntarily
assembl[ing] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism." Id. (citing OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.13 (1969)). In other words, the statute punished people who freely assembled and
discussed violent actions, even in a peaceful manner. Id. at 449.
49. Id. at 446.
50. Id. at 445.
51. See generally Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (upholding the
constitutionality of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act), overruled in part by
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (holding that
advocating violent means to effect changes posed political and economic danger to the
state).
52. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The Brandenburg Court cited Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 (1951), as a case which specifically discredited Whitney. Id.
at 447. The Supreme Court commented that, "[t]hese later decisions have fashioned the
principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy and the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449.
53. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The Court ruled that this type of statute "falls
within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id.
54. Id.
55. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
56. ld. at 188.
57. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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orientation.58 In Bowers, the police charged a man with violating the
anti-sodomy statute after they entered his home and found him
engaged in the prohibited act with another man.5 Admitting that he
practiced homosexuality, the defendant argued that the sodomy statute
violated his constitutional right to privacy. 60 The Supreme Court,
however, held that the Constitution never recognized a fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sex 6' and refused to invalidate the antisodomy laws. 62 Noting that many states had criminalized sodomy as

early as the inception of the Bill of Rights,6 3 the Supreme Court
concluded that anti-sodomy legislation possessed a long, legitimate
history which it declined to overturn. 64
Thus, after nearly 100 years of attempted legislation, the Court still
refused to unequivocally delineate the boundaries of regulation against
traditionally scorned activities. 65 Because of the Court's historical
58. Id. at 188 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984)). Georgia's statute provides in
part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to
any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus
of another...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years ....
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 192-96. First, the Supreme Court disputed the defendant's contention that
the Court's prior cases imbued homosexuals with a privacy protection under the
Constitution. Id. at 190. The Court then refused to announce that the Constitution
guaranteed homosexuals a fundamental right to engage in sodomy. Id. at 191. The Court
reasoned that fundamental liberties only include liberties "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. at 191-92
(quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
62. Id. at 196. The defendants asserted that the only support for the laws came solely
from the majority's prejudice against homosexual sodomy. Id. The Petitioner suggested
that this reasoning fails to substantiate such an unjust law. Id. The majority disagreed,
noting that the Petitioner's argument failed to persuade the court to invalidate the
Georgia law or any of the other 25 states' laws on such a basis. Id. at 192-96.
63. Id. at 192-94 nn.5 & 6 (listing the states with anti-sodomy laws since the
inception of the Bill of Rights).
64. Id. at 196. Justice Blackmun's dissent, however, disputed the majority's logic.
Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that the Supreme Court should
discuss the issue in light of the Constitutional right to privacy and noted that the law
applied not only to homosexuals, but heterosexuals as well. Id. at 200 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Blackmun argued that the states should not delve into fundamental,
guaranteed constitutional rights and that this law violated the United States Supreme
Court's decisions upholding the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy. Id. at 20714 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., supra notes 34-43, 47-64 and accompanying text.
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refusal to strike down any law dealing with traditionally scorned
sexual practices, legislation against homosexuality continued.66
Eventually homosexual plaintiffs sought to invoke the Equal Protection
Clause to protect themselves against this discriminatory legislation.67
B. The FourteenthAmendment Standards of Review
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution states, in pertinent part, "No State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. 68 When initially passed, the Equal Protection Clause was
thought to apply primarily to racial discrimination. 69 However, under
the United States Supreme Court's guidance, the Equal Protection
Clause evolved into a triumphant defender of traditionally stigmatized
groups and fundamental liberties.7° Currently, commentators refer to
the Equal Protection Clause as "the single most important concept in
the Constitution for the protection of individual rights.'
Because the Equal Protection Clause seeks to prevent certain types
of class-based discrimination, the actual class designation plays an
important role in any equal protection analysis.72 The Supreme Court
66. See infra Part Il.C for a discussion of post-Bowers legislation.
67. See infra Part lI.C for a discussion of post-Bowers legislation.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
69. See, e.g., Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See also Richard
F. Duncan & Gary L. Young, Homosexual Rights & Citizen Initiatives: Is
Constitutionalism Unconstitutional?,9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'Y 93, 101
(1995) (citing Slaughter-House Cases to illustrate the Court's historical view of the
Equal Protection Clause).
70. See GERALD GUNTHER, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PART lI70 (4th
ed. 1986) (illustrating the evolution of the Fourteenth Amendment).
7 1. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 121, 121 (1989). According to the Supreme Court, the Equal Protection Clause
protects suspect classes like racial minorities, resident aliens, and ethnic minorities
from arbitrary and capricious legislation. Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect
Classifications: On Discriminating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 937,
938 (1991). See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (holding that
resident aliens constitute a suspect class); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(holding that race constitutes a suspect class); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214, 216 (1944) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause shields people from
discrimination based solely on ethnic origins or national ancestry).
Other
characteristics, such as gender and illegitimacy of birth, also receive a high level of
protection from discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Mississippi
Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding that a law which
discriminates based on gender must substantially relate to a sufficiently important
governmental interest); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 265 (1978) (ruling that
illegitimacy cases require heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause).
72. Daniel J. Garfield, Comment, Don't Box Me In: The Unconstitutionality of
Amendment 2 and English-Only Amendments, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 690, 705-06 (1995).
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has set forth several standards of review, each dependent upon the
class designation in the challenged legislation: (1) the rational basis
test; (2) strict scrutiny; and (3) intermediate scrutiny." The Court
additionally maintains that the Equal Protection Clause staunchly
guards fundamental rights 74 from legislation that attempts to override
these guarantees.75
1. Rational Basis Review
Generally, where a piece of legislation negatively impacts a
particular group with distinguished characteristics, a court seeks only
to verify that the law bears a rational relationship to a compelling
governmental purpose.76 So long as the legislation is relevant and
closely related to a state's valid interest, 77 the legislation's challenger
has the burden of discrediting all rational justifications for the law.78
For these reasons, the rational basis standard constitutes the least
restrictive standard courts use when examining a law's
constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.79
This minimal standard of review grants the states the latitude
necessary to establish classifications80 to meet a perceived problem,
accommodate competing concerns regarding the problem, and deal
with any practical limitations. 8 The courts allow much deference
because they presume that "improvident [classifications] will
eventually be rectified by the democratic process. 8 2 However, some
The Court applies three different tiers of scrutiny based on the various classifications.
Id. at 705. The degree of scrutiny varies among the different classes. Id. at 706.
73. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41 (1985).
74. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 11.7, at 388
(4th ed. 1991) (defining fundamental rights as "having a value so essential to individual
liberty in our society" that the Constitution guarantees them under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause).
75. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (holding that the Court must
apply strict scrutiny when a state's law violates the Equal Protection Clause by
interfering with the fundamental right).
76. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982).
77. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441-42.
78. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1993).
79. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. Historically, courts apply this minimal standard to
gay rights cases. See infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of homosexual rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
80. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216. The Plyler Court noted that differences exist between
people, and sometimes, to combat a specific problem, a government may classify the
various groups by these distinguishing traits. Id.
8 1. Id. (stating that since a legislature may face a nebulous problem, the Court
requires only "[t]he assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship
to a legitimate public purpose").
82. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Cleburne,
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legislation might exceed these perimeters and impinge upon citizens'
exercise of their fundamental rights, 3 or disadvantage an entire
"suspect" class.8 In these cases, the state must meet a higher standard
to prove that the legislation reflects a precisely tailored state interest.85
2. Strict Scrutiny Standard of Review
Courts apply a strict standard of review when a state enacts
legislation that tends to abuse "elemental constitutional premises. 86
Specifically, the legislation may not infringe upon a fundamental
right 87 or disadvantage a "suspect class., 8 8 The United States
Supreme Court defined fundamental rights as those rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" 89 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." 90 For example, fundamental rights include
(among others) access to the judicial system,9 the right to vote,92 the
right to have one's vote counted equally,93 the right to free speech,94
and the right to interstate migration. 95
473 U.S. at 440).
83. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of fundamental
rights.
84. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). See also Schweiker v.
Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) ("Unless a statute employs a classification that is
inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental rights . . . this Court properly
exercises only a limited review power over Congress .... "). See infra notes 96-100 and
accompanying text for a definition of a suspect class.
85. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
86. Id. at 216. The Plyler Court did not directly define "elemental constitutional
premises," but noted that examples include: the right to receive equal justice under the
law, regardless of race, and the right to cast a vote equal to every other citizen. Id. at
nn.14-15. See generally Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-41.
87. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of fundamental
rights.
88. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217. See also infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text
for the definition of "suspect class."
89. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled in part by Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
90. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
91. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that an indigent
convict has the right to counsel on appeal).
92. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (holding that a law which
deprives a citizen of the right to vote must pass the strict scrutiny standard of review).
93. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (ruling that
the government must count every vote equally).
94. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (finding
that public education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, unlike
the right to free speech which does constitute a fundamental right, and therefore deserves
the protection of the strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause).
95. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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A court considers classes "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" when the
court decides that the group exhibits the following characteristics: (1)
a history of discrimination; (2) an obvious, immutable or
distinguishing characteristic that defines it as a discrete group; and, (3)
a lack of political power. 96 Courts have historically designated suspect
classifications based on race, 97 alienage, 98 and national ancestry or
ethnic origin. 99 Under the strict scrutiny test, a court must reject a law
if the legislature failed to narrowly tailor the law to support a
compelling state interest with the least restrictive means possible." °
3. Intermediate Scrutiny
Under the intermediate standard of scrutiny, courts examine whether
the classification in question provides equal protection of law for all
citizens, while also maintaining a substantial relation to an important
governmental interest.'' Generally, courts apply this intermediate
standard to legislation that offends a "quasi-suspect"'' 0 2 class or
infringes on an important, but not fundamental, right.0 3
The Supreme Court has never established exact factors to determine
a quasi-suspect status. 0 4 Rather, the Court has relied on various
96. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573
(9th Cir. 1990) (noting that homosexuals possess a history of discrimination, but fail
to meet either of the other two characteristics).
97. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding that race constitutes a
suspect class).
98. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (ruling that states could not
deny welfare benefits to aliens).
99. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that a law
that segregated a whole group, Japanese-American citizens, survived strict scrutiny and
was constitutional, but also noting that national ancestry constituted a suspect class).
100. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
101. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217. The Plyler Court stated, "in these limited
circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned
judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly
be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State." Id. at 217-18.
102. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
(defining quasi-suspect class as a class that does not receive the same protection as a
suspect class or a fundamental right, but nevertheless, receives heightened scrutiny).
103. Courts determined that they must protect certain rights even though those rights
fail to constitute fundamental rights. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 16-33, at 1612 & n.15 (2d ed. 1988). See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432
(shelter); Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (education); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415
U.S. 250 (1974) (medical services); United States Dept. of Agric. v. Murray, 413 U.S.
508 (1973) (food); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (welfare benefits).
104. See TRIBE, supra note 103, §§ 16-33, at 1614.
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factors, such as: (1) a group's lack of political clout;'0 5 (2) the
immutability of certain personal traits of each member within the
group; 0 6 (3) whether the group constitutes a "discrete and insular
minority;"'' 0 7 and (4)8 whether the classification stereotypes or
stigmatizes the group.1
Courts usually employ intermediate scrutiny to review legislation
that demonstrates a bias against gender'0 9 or illegitimately born
children." 0 Although courts realize that some groups require more
stringent protection than that afforded by intermediate scrutiny,"' the
Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts
remain reluctant to expand
12
the suspect or quasi-suspect class status.1
C. Equal Protection,FundamentalRights, and Homosexuality
1. Homosexuality and Equal Protection of the Law
As with all equal protection challenges, those challenges predicated
upon homosexuality focus on the target class." 3 Prior to Romer v.
Evans, courts consistently held that homosexuals did not constitute a
suspect class." 4 Likewise, courts refused to establish homosexuality
105. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443.
106. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (noting that
legislation which discriminates based on one's "status of birth" deserves heightened
scrutiny review).
107. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (holding
that a group's status as a "discrete and insular minority" implies quasi-suspect status).
108. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-85 (1973) (finding that a
classification which serves to stigmatize and stereotype grants the identifiable class
quasi-suspect status).
109. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (holding
that intermediate review requires a showing that the law in question substantially relates
to a sufficiently important governmental interest).
I 10. See, e.g., Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
11 1. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42
(1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 218-20 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976).
1 12. See, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio
1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519
(1996); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-42; Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S.
1009, 1015-16 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Plyler, 457
U.S. at 218-20; High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573 (9th Cir. 1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 1989).
113. See generally Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 (finding gender classifications constitute
an equal protection challenge); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (equal
protection challenge based on race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (person may bring an equal protection challenge based upon national ancestry
classifications).
114. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (denying homosexuals suspect class
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as a fundamental right." 5 Thus, courts historically applied the rational
basis test to homosexuals' equal protection challenges." 6 Under this
most deferential standard, the courts refused, to override any legislation
that targeted homosexuals.' '
A court first applied the rational basis test to a homosexual's equal
protection claim in Beller v. Middendorf."' In Beller, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the military's regulatory goals
outweighed the rights of homosexuals to engage in consensual, private
homosexual conduct." 9 In Beller, the Navy informed the homosexual
plaintiff that it intended to grant him security clearance and access to
secret information. 121 Upon learning of the plaintiff's sexual
orientation, however, the Navy, instead of offering the plaintiff a
promotion, sought his honorable discharge.12' The court reasoned that
it must respect the Navy's laws and policies since the military
constitutes a specialized society. 2 2 The court also determined that the
Navy possessed several important interests that eclipsed the rights of
homosexual plaintiffs.' 23 Thus, the appellate court upheld the Naval
policy, 24 although it did recognize that in certain instances, some
forms of governmental regulation of private, consensual homosexual
behavior may face a "substantial constitutional challenge.' 25

status). See also Tracey T. Kenton, Note & Comment, Quasi-Suspect Status for
Homosexuals in Equal Protection Analysis: Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v.
City of Cincinnati, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 873, 896 (1996) (noting that every circuit
court that addressed the issue of whether the court should grant homosexuals suspect or
quasi-suspect status decided against doing so).
115. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no fundamental right to engage
in homosexual acts).
116. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 464 (denying homosexuals suspect class
status and applying rational basis test).
117. See Kenton, supra note 114, at 896. See infra text accompanying notes 118-44
(discussing the deferential rational relation standard and homosexual rights litigation).
118. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 810.
120. Id. at 794.
121. Id. at 795.
122. Id. at 810.
123. The appellate court cited a few examples of legitimate interests that the Navy
must protect to the detriment of homosexuals' privacy rights. Id. at 811-12. Legitimate
Naval interests included: the Navy's desire to protect the fabric of military life; the
Navy's desire to preserve the integrity of the recruiting process; its desire to maintain
discipline; and the Navy's goal of insuring the acceptance into different cultures of the
men and women in the Naval service around the world. Id. at 811.
124. Id. at 812.
125. Id. at 810.
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Following Beller, the courts continued to allow government
bureaucracies outside the military to legislate against homosexuals.'26
In Padula v. Webster,2 7 the court applied the rational basis test to
uphold the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") decision not to
employ a homosexual female. 2 The plaintiff urged the court to apply
a strict scrutiny standard and grant homosexuals the status of a suspect
or quasi-suspect class. 2 9 The court noted that preceding case law
foreclosed the Padula plaintiffs argument"30 but added that "[this]
does not mean ...that any kind of negative state action against
homosexuals would be constitutionally authorized."' 13' Further, the
court explained that a law discriminating against homosexuals must
126. See Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987). See generally High Tech
Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990). In High
Tech Gays, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Defense's ("DOD") policy of
refusing to grant security clearance to known or suspected gay applicants under the First
and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 565. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, citing
Bowers rejected the district court's finding that the sexual orientation classifications
warranted "quasi-suspect" status under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 573-74. The
appellate court noted that a suspect class: (1)suffered a history of discrimination; (2)
exhibits obvious, immutable or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
distinct group; and (3) shows that they constitute a minority which lacks political power
or shows that the statutory classification at issue burdened a fundamental right. Id. at
573. The appellate court found that homosexuality failed to constitute an immutable
characteristic even though the court admitted homosexuals had suffered a history of
discrimination. Id.
But see Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Rowland, a
school fired a teacher shortly after learning about her bisexuality. Id. at 1010 (Brennan,
J.,dissenting). The Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari. Id. at 1009 (Brennan,
J.,dissenting). However, Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, suggested that
homosexuals deserve suspect or quasi-suspect class status. Id. at 1014 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The Justice found that homosexuals lose political power once society
identifies them publicly and, therefore, since homosexuals lose power simply based on
their status as members of the particular group, the Court should grant homosexuals
suspect or quasi-suspect class status. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
127. 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
128. Id.at98.
129. Id. at 102.
130. Id. at 103. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in support of its position. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103.
The court claimed that
[iut
would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct
that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. . . . If the Court was unwilling to object to
state laws that criminalize the behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open
to a lower court to conclude that state sponsored discrimination against the
class is invidious. After all, there can hardly be more palpable discrimination
against a class than making the conduct that defines the class criminal.
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64 for a discussion of Bowers.
13 1. Padula, 822 F.2d at 103-04.
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still pass a rational basis test and identify a legitimate government
purpose.'32 Ultimately, the court upheld the law and concluded that,
because the FBI possessed a legitimate interest to secure
information,
33
it did not violate the plaintiffs constitutional rights.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals also applied the rational basis
test when it examined whether a publicly enacted law which targeted
homosexuals violated the Constitution. 34 In Equality Foundation v.
City of Cincinnati,'35 a city council passed several ordinances to
prevent discriminatory hiring practices against homosexuals, as well as
other groups. 36 In opposition, the voters ratified an amendment
which prevented the city council from granting special protections
based on sexual orientation.' 37 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court and upheld the constitutionality of the

132. Id. at 104.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995),
vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
135. 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996) (cert. granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light
of Romer III).
1 36. Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 263. The city council enacted two ordinances. Id.
Ordinance No. 79-1991, commonly known as the "Equal Employment Opportunity
Ordinance," states that the city of Cincinnati could not discriminate in hiring on the
basis of "classification factors such as race, color, sex, handicap, religion, national or
ethnic origin, age, sexual orientation, HIV status, Appalachian regional ancestry, and
marital status." Id. (emphasis added). The council then adopted Ordinance No. 4901992, commonly known as the "Human Rights Ordinance." Id. The "Human Rights
Ordinance" prohibits "[u]nlawful discriminatory practices in the city of Cincinnati based
on race, gender, age, color, religion, disability status, sexual orientation, marital status,
or ethnic, national or Appalachian regional origin, in employment, housing, public
accommodations ...
I.d."(emphasis added).
137. Id. at 264. A group of Cincinnati citizens calling themselves "Equal Rights Not
Special Rights" ("ERNSR") sponsored Issue 3 as an amendment to the city constitution.
Id. Issue 3 ultimately appeared on the ballot as:
ARTICLE XII
NO SPECIAL CLASS STATUS MAY BE GRANTED BASED UPON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, CONDUCT OR RELATIONSHIPS: The City of Cincinnati and
its various Boards and Commissions may not enact, adopt, enforce or
administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which provides that
homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or relationship
constitutes, entitles or otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any
claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other preferential
treatment. This provision of the City Charter shall in all respects be selfexecuting. Any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy enacted before this
amendment is adopted that violates the foregoing prohibition shall be null
and void and of no force or effect.
Id. The electorate voted on Issue 3 and passed it by a margin of 62% to 38%. Id.
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Amendment.'38 The court noted that no law can be so narrowly drawn
to protect groups which are defined by subjective, innate
characteristics such as desires, sexual drives, and thoughts. 3 9
Because homosexual characteristics defy ordinary classifications, the
court concluded that homosexuals do not deserve suspect class status
protection."o Accordingly, the appellate court applied the rational
basis test to the Amendment. 4 ' The court held the Amendment
rationally related to a number of legitimate state interests: 42 the
freedom from a mandate forcing people to associate with homosexuals;
government neutrality on the issue of respecting homosexuals; and
increased freedom to maintain one's own personal beliefs regarding

138. Id. at 271. At the district court level, the court held:
[W]e conclude that there is a strong likelihood that under the ... [a]mendment,
all citizens, with the express exception of [homosexuals], have the right to
appeal directly to the members of city council for legislation, while only
[homosexuals] must proceed via the exceptionally arduous and costly route of
amending the city charter before they may obtain any legislation bearing on
their sexual orientation.
Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
139. Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 267.
140. Id. But see Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436-38
(S.D. Ohio 1994), affd in part, vacated in part, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996). The district court found that homo-, hetero-, and
bisexual orientations constitute a characteristic beyond an individual's control. Id. at
437. According to the district court, to determine whether homosexual individuals
constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class, a court must consider the following factors:
(1) whether the person's sexual orientation affects their ability to perform; (2) whether
the members of a group possess any control over their orientation; (3) whether sexual
orientation constitutes an immutable characteristic; (4) whether the people
discriminated against that group based on their sexual orientation; and (5) whether the
class lacks political power. Id. at 436. In its discussion of these factors, the court
found, through "credible and unrebutted" testimony at trial, that sexual orientation
develops in people around ages 3-5 and simply matures through adulthood. Id. The court
also distinguished between sexual orientation and sexual conduct. Id. To make the
distinction, the court referred to trial testimony from Dr. Gonsiorek, and stated,
"[s]exual orientation 'is a predisposition toward erotic, sexual, affiliation or affection
relationship towards one's own and/or the other gender' and is not simply defined by
conduct." Id. at 437 (quoting Dr. Gonsiorek). Subsequently, the district court found that
sexual orientation consists of "characteristics, not only beyond the control of the
individual, but also ones existing independently of any conduct that the individual,
hetero-, homo- or bisexual, may choose to engage in." Id. The court added that the
evidence presented revealed that people cannot change their sexual orientation. Id. at
438. The court concluded that homosexuals constituted a quasi-suspect class based on
the factors. Id. at 440.
14 I. See Equality Found., 54 F.3d at 270.
142. Id.
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other's actions. 143 Therefore, the court upheld the amendment's
constitutionality.'"
2. A Fundamental Right to Participate Equally
in the Political Process
The right to vote constitutes a core principle of the United States
democratic system. 145 The United States Supreme Court has rejected
various legislative attempts to unbalance the equality that all voters
maintain. 46 Although the Court has never expressly announced such
a right, 41 a series of cases appear to demonstrate that the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees a fundamental right to participate equally
in the political process. 48 At the very least, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated that the Equal Protection Clause does not permit
legislation to affect unreasonable biases upon
a specific voting block or
49
vote.
group's
that
disempower
unjustly
to
143. Id. at 270-71.
144. Id. at 271. The defendants, after losing in the appellate court, petitioned the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari. Id. The Court granted certiorari, and vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of
its Romer III ruling. Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined, dissented
from the majority's holding. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In the dissent, Justice Scalia
rejected the majority's decision to remand the case because he contended that Romer III
and Equality Foundation dealt with distinctly different issues which the Court could not
so easily reconcile. Id. (Scalia, J. dissenting). The Justice asserted that Romer III
entitled cities to pursue special protections for homosexuals without having to persuade
the legislature to amend the state constitution, while Equality Foundation. considered a
city charter amendment which prohibits granting homosexuals special protections. Id.
(Scalia, J. dissenting). Further, the opinion hypothesized that if the Court held the
Equality Foundation amendment unconstitutional, it would effectively bar all citizens
from ever democratically voting to deny homosexuals special protections. Id. (Scalia,
J. dissenting). The dissent found this proposition absurd and claimed that Romer III
never addressed this issue and certainly did not support it. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Thus, the dissent argued that the Court should either deny certiorari altogether or set the
case for argument to determine the "ultra-Romer" issue Equality Foundation presented.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Colo. 1993) (citing Note, Developments
in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1114 (1975) ("'no institution is more
central to the United States' system of representative democracy than the election"').
146. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); and Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
147. See, e.g., Evans (b), 854 P.2d at 1294 (Erickson, J., dissenting). According to
the Colorado Supreme Court dissent, the United States Supreme Court identified the
fundamental right that everyone's vote counts equally, but never explicitly established a
fundamental right to participate equally. Id.
148. See Evans (b), 854 P.2d at 1276.
149. See infra text accompanying notes 150-76 (discussing the Supreme Court's use
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For example, the Supreme Court used the Equal Protection Clause
to invalidate legislation that disempowered a specific segment of voters
based on property ownership. 50 In Kramer v. Union Free School
DistrictNo. 15., 5 ' non-property owners challenged a statute which
afforded the right to vote in school board elections only to owners or
lessees of taxable realty or parents or guardians of public school
children. 5 2 The Kramer Court held that the legislation unfairly
restricted a fundamental right-the right to effectively participate in
governmental affairs. 153 Thus, the United States Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny to the legislation since the Act impaired the nonowners' and non-lessees' ability to effectively participate in school
board elections. 54 The Kramer Court concluded that, under this
statute, many people lost the power to
control government affairs
5
lives.'
their
affected
substantially
which
of the Equal Protection Clause to prevent unreasonable biases against minority groups'
voting power).
150. See, e.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. at 621.
151. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (holding that any state violates the Fourteenth Amendment when it requires
prospective voters to pay a fee to vote or attempts to impose a poll tax of any sort);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (examining Tennessee's durational residence
requirement act). In Dunn, the Court applied the strict scrutiny standard to the Tennessee
law since the Supreme Court stated that the Tennessee law deprived persons of a
"fundamental political right"-the right to vote. Id. at 335-36 (citing Reynolds, 377
U.S. at 562). The Court noted that Tennessee's argument for "ballot box purity" and
"knowledgeable voters" failed to constitute compelling state interests. Id. at 345, 354,
358-59. Thus, the Court rejected the legislation on Equal Protection grounds. Id. at
360.
152. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 622-23.
153. Id. at 626-27. The Court noted that statutes which only allow residents to vote
on a restrictive basis, pose the danger of denying some citizens an effective voice in the
governmental affairs which affect them. Id. Thus, the Court must determine whether the
exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest if a challenged state
statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents and denies the franchise to
others. Id. at 627.
154. Id. at 627-28.
155. Id. at 630-32 ("The classifications in § 2012 permit inclusion of many persons
who have, at best, a remote and indirect interest in school affairs and, on the other hand,
exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions.").
Following the Kramer holding, the Colorado Supreme Court applied Kramer in Evans
1(b), and, like the United States Supreme Court, used a strict scrutiny standard to hold
that Amendment 2 curbed homosexuals' fundamental voting rights. Evans l(b), 854
P.2d 1270, 1285 (Colo. 1993). The United States Supreme Court, however, chose not to
examine Amendment 2 in the same manner. Romer II1, 116 S. Ct. at 1624. The Court
instead employed the rational relation standard under the Equal Protection Clause when it
ruled on Amendment 2, but it neglected to expand on its reasons for disregarding Kramer.
Id. at 1627. See infra Part IV for a comparison of the Colorado Supreme Court's and the
United States Supreme Court's logic.

612

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

In addition to rejecting property-ownership classifications as criteria
for voting rights, the Court has overturned legislation that effectively
disenfranchises voters based on ethnic or cultural groupings. 5 6 In
Hunter v. Erickson,'57 the United States Supreme Court struck down
an Akron, Ohio, charter amendment that required a majority of the
electorate's approval for any housing ordinances based on religion,
race, or ancestry. 58 The Court applied the strict scrutiny standard
because the law explicitly and unfairly impacted racial minorities-a
suspect class.' 59
Although the Hunter Court initially applied an equal protection
analysis to the legislation in question since it "place[d] special burdens
on racial minorities within the governmental process" by preventing
minorities from receiving the same treatment as non-minorities,' 6° the
Supreme Court also held that the legislation unfairly weakened
the
6
plaintiffs vote in comparison to the vote of other citizens.' '
156. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
157. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
158. Id. at 386-87.
159. Id. at 391-92
160. Id. at 391. In one instance, a real estate agent refused to show the plaintiff,
Nellie Hunter, a house in a neighborhood because the owners signed a letter that
prohibited the agent from showing the house to "negroes." Id. at 387. In its decision,
the Court noted that even though the electorate adopted the policy through popular
referendum, the Equal Protection Clause still applied to the "sovereignty of the people."
Id. at 392-93. The Court stated, "the State may no more disadvantage any particular
group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any
person's vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable
size." Id. at 393.
161. See id. In his concurrence, Justice Harlan stressed maintaining equality in the
electorate. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "the diverse political groups in our
society may fairly compete"). Later courts followed this sentiment. See Washington v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). In Washington, the voters adopted an
initiative which prohibited school boards from requiring any student to attend a school
other than the one geographically nearest to his home. Id. at 462. However, the
initiative made exceptions for almost all purposes except for racial integration. Id. The
United States Supreme Court relied on its decision in Hunter to strike down the Act and
stated that the Equal Protection Clause "guarantee[d] racial minorities the right to full
participation in the political life of the community." Id. at 467-70. See also infra notes
212-23 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the Colorado Supreme Court's
use of Hunter.
See also Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971). In Gordon, a West Virginia statute
required state and local governments to put a referendum vote on all bond indebtedness
and tax increases. Id. at 2. The proposals became law only if 60% of the majority voted
for them. Id. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the 60% requirement
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 3. The United States
Supreme Court rejected the challenge and upheld the statute. Id. Moreover, the Gordon
Court distinguished Hunter by noting that the Act in Hunter concerned an identifiable
group of voters, independent of the statute. Id. at 5. See infra text accompanying notes
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In addition to promoting voter equality, the Court has also held that
the electorate cannot limit the voting rights of certain groups by
62
unevenly distributing power within the electorate itself.
Specifically, the Court has held that a government may not create laws
which unjustly keep candidates off the ballot. 163 In Williams v.
Rhodes,' 64 Ohio enacted legislation which made it extremely difficult
for certain political parties to place themselves on the state election
ballot.' 65 Without establishing a fundamental right to participate in the
voting process, the Court applied strict scrutiny to strike down the

220-23 for a discussion regarding the Colorado Supreme Court's use of Gordon.
See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). In Reitman, the United States
Supreme Court held the California Constitution Amendment Proposition 14
unconstitutional. Id. at 373. The Amendment essentially allowed owners and lessors to
discriminate among those to whom they sold or leased property. Id. at 374, 377. Also,
the Amendment repealed a number of fair housing statutes the California legislature
previously passed. Id. The Reitman Court adopted the California Supreme Court's
finding that the Act authorized racial discrimination in the housing market and would
significantly involve the state in private discrimination and thereby violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 374-76.
But see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). In James, the California voters
passed an article to the state constitution which provided that nobody should build lowrent housing until the local voting majority approved the project. Id. at 139. The
United States Supreme Court upheld the referendum and distinguished Hunter by noting
that the Hunter Act placed special burdens on racial minorities. Id. at 140-42.
According to the James Court, the California article applied across the board to any lowrent housing, not solely to special minority projects or any "independently identifiable
group." Id. at 141-42.
The dissenting opinion in Evans 1(b) relied heavily on James. See Evans 1(b), 854
P.2d at 1295-1300 (Erickson, J., dissenting). See infra note 227 (discussing Justice
Erickson's dissenting opinion). But see Garfield, supra note 72, at 726 (discussing
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion and why James may serve to support the Colorado
Supreme Court majority rather than diminish it as Judge Erickson's dissenting view
suggests).
162. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (holding that courts should
apply the strict scrutiny standard to laws which prevent candidates from getting on the
election ballot). See infra note 344 and accompanying text, which questions why the
majority ignored Williams, even though the text of Amendment 2 implicitly prohibited
gay candidates because Amendment 2 allows gay candidates' opponents and other critics
to discriminate against homosexuals, thereby preventing them from running. See also
Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1626 (noting that Amendment 2 "operates to repeal and forbid
all laws" protecting homosexuals from discrimination at every level of Colorado
government).
163. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 31.
164. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
165. Id. at 24-25. To acquire a place on the ballot, the Ohio legislation required the
political party to "obtain petitions signed by qualified electors totaling 15% of the
number of ballots cast in the last preceding gubernatorial election." Id. Additionally, at
the primary election, the party had to elect a "state central committee" and "delegates
and alternates to a national convention." Id. at 25 n.l.
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act.' 66 The Court reasoned that the election laws effectively limited the
ballot to the two major parties by making it virtually impossible for a
new political party to get on the ballot.167 The Williams Court
reasoned that the act denied equal protection to some citizens since
it
68
prevented them from exercising the right to express political ideas. 1
In another voting rights case, the Court held that government
legislation may not unjustly disempower a specific group by69
attempting to redesign voting districts in a discriminatory manner.1
In Reynolds v. Sims, 170 Alabama attempted to restructure its
legislature by reapportioning the number of seats each district
received.17' The Supreme Court employed the strict scrutiny test
because, it reasoned, equal protection requires that the Constitution
guarantee to citizens the right to vote, and the Court must protect that
right. 72 According to the Court, "the overriding objective must be
substantial equality of population among the various districts so that
[the] vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any
other citizen in the State."' 7 3 Thus, the Court held that the
166. See id. at 30-31.
167. Id. In Williams, only the Republican and Democratic candidates qualified for the
ballot. Id. at 25.
168. Id. at 34.
169. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478
U.S. 109 (1986). In Bandemer, the Court upheld an Indiana apportionment plan against
a gerrymandering challenge. Id. at 129-30. In the plurality opinion, Justice White
noted that "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is
arranged in a manner that will consistently degrade a voter's or group of voters'
influence in the political process." Id. at 132. But see Garfield, supra note 72, at 72122, for a compact discussion of Bandemer. In Garfield's opinion, the Indiana
reapportionment plan effectively disadvantaged the Democratic candidate in favor of the
Republican, although the Bandemer Court suggests that the Equal Protection Clause
protects a political group's rights to participate equally in elections. Id. at 723. Indeed,
Garfield notes that in Bandemer: "The [United States Supreme Court] strongly
suggest[ed] that the right to an equal vote works to promote equal political
participation." Id.
170. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17 1. Id. at 543-45.
172. See id. at 565-66. The Supreme Court in Gray v. Saunders, concluded that "[tihe
conception of political equality ...can only mean one thing-one person, one vote."
372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963). In Reynolds, Chief Justice Warren stated:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres . . . . And, if a State should
provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State should be given two
times, or five times, or ten times the weight of votes of citizens in another
part of the State, it could hardly be contended that the right to vote of those
residing in the disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
173. Id. at 579. Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court recognized that Amendment
2 restricted homosexuals' voting power. Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1285. The United
States Supreme Court agreed that Amendment 2 eliminated many rights of homosexuals
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reapportionment plan lacked rationality since the legislature did not
base it on the number of people in each district. 17 However, the
Court once again did not explicitly establish a fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process. 75 The Court's lack of
clarity leaves open the argument that legislation which inhibits equal
participation in the political process violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 176
III. DISCUSSION

A. Amendment 2 's PoliticalHistory
Prior to the passage of Amendment 2,' 7 7 some Colorado
municipalities sought to extend general, anti-discriminatory protections79
to its citizens.178 Like many public officials across the country,
lawmakers in some cities, such as Aspen, Denver, and Boulder,
thought that homosexuals deserved the same protections as other
identifiable groups.18 So as not to unfairly advantage one favored
minority group over another, the cities designed the legislation to
protect numerous defined groups (including, but not limited to,
homosexuals) from discrimination in both the work place and public

and limited their voting power, but the Court did not adopt Reynolds to sustain its
argument. Romer I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1625-27. See infra note 344 for a discussion of how
the United States Supreme Court could have used Reynolds effectively.
174. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568-69. The voting regulation discriminated against
residents who lived in populous areas in favor of those residents in rural sections. Id. at
569-70. The Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in both
houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis." Id.
at 568.
175. See id. at 566.
176. See, e.g., Evans I(b), 854 P.2d at 1284-86 (arguing that Amendment 2 violated
the plaintiff's right to participate equally in the political process).
177. The Colorado electorate passed Amendment 2 on November 3, 1992. COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 30(b) (West Supp. 1996) (historical notes).
178. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the various Colorado municipality
ordinances protecting homosexuals from discrimination.
179. See generally Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1905 (1993) (discussing the increasing use of legislation to protect
against discriminatory actions based on sexual orientation). In the recent past, more
than 130 jurisdictions enacted legislation to protect people with different sexual
orientations. Id. at 1905, 1908. This increase in gay right activism provoked
fundamental religious groups to rally supporters and attempt to repeal the antidiscrimination measures. Id. at 1905.
180. See generally Romer III, 116 S. Ct. at 1623 (noting that statewide controversy
erupted because the ordinance extended protections to persons discriminated against
based on their sexual orientation).
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areas.' 8 1 Thus, the cities attempted to further establish their platform
by protecting homosexuals, along with other
against discrimination 182
groups.
disadvantaged
Some of the general Colorado electorate, however, found these
ordinances intrusive. 83 In addition, some notably conservative
groups led a drive to eradicate these ordinances. 84 Specifically, CFV
began a campaign against the municipality initiatives and assembled
enough Colorado voters' signatures to place Amendment 2 on the
November 1992 ballot. 8 5 CFV argued against "special protections"
for homosexuals, claiming that homosexuals do not face the same
problems as other identifiable groups, such as racial or ethnic
minorities.1 86 Moreover, CFV used right-wing rhetoric, usually88
culminating in scripture quoting,'7 to inflame the Colorado citizens.1
18 1. See supra note 7 for a description of ordinances in Aspen, Denver, and Boulder.
182. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized that "[t]he immediate objective of
Amendment 2 is, at a minimum, to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances, and
policies of state and local entities that barred discrimination based on sexual
orientation." Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1284.
183. Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 605822, at *21 (U.S. Oral. Arg., Oct.
10, 1995) (citing the oral argument of Timothy M. Tymkovich, Solicitor General of
Colorado, Denver, Colorado on behalf of the Petitioners). In response to a question,
Tymkovich stated, "[t]he purpose of this statute was to preempt State and local laws that
extended special protections. It was a response to political activism by a political
group that wanted to seek special affirmative protections under the law." Id. at *20.
Later in the argument, Tymkovich commented, "I think the problem . . . that the voters
saw, they were presented with an opportunity to preempt and make a decision at the
statewide level for laws that raise particular and sensitive liberty concerns." Id. at *24.
184. Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at *2, Evans
v. Romer, No. 92-CV-7223, 1993 WL 19678 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 1993), aff'd on other
grounds, Romer !!!, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
185. See Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1272; Evans l(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *6. See also
Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda,"
1 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33 (1994). Russell stated that:
[R]ight-wing conservative groups, such as Colorado for Family Values, the
Traditional Values Coalition, the National Legal Foundation, and the Free
Congress Foundation, chose the apparently "liberal" state of Colorado as their
first major target for an anti-gay rights initiative in 1992, many observers
were surprised .

. .

.

However, Colorado proved to be an optimal testing

ground for a number of reasons, not the least of which was precisely its record
as a state very much in the vanguard of establishing legal protections for
lesbians, gays and bisexuals.
Id. at 42.
186. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 24 (highlighting CFV's argument in favor of
Amendment 2 and against any extra protections for homosexuals).
187. See Russell, supra note 185, at 44 n.38 (citing Tony Marco, SPECIAL GAY
RIGHTS LEGISLATION 42 (1991) (position paper of CFV). Marco decried, "Gay behavior is
what the Bible calls 'sin' because sin defines any attempt to solve human problems or
meet human needs without regard to God's wisdom and solutions as found in Scripture
and in His saving grace and mercy." Id. See also Jean Hardisty, Constructing
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Their arguments played upon and "exploit[ed] fears of employment
quotas and affirmative action."'' 89 In addition, CFV attempted to
establish Amendment 2's purpose as being that of a concerned, helpful
legislation that would protect people from the evil homosexuality
wrought.' 90
CFV's efforts culminated in their official sponsorship of the
Amendment 2 legislation.' 9' On November 3, 1992, Colorado voters
decided to officially adopt Amendment 2 by a vote of 813,966 to
710,151 (fifty-three percent to forty-seven percent). 92 On November
12, 1992, Amendment 2's critics initiated an action to have
Amendment 2 declared unconstitutional on its face and to enjoin its
enforcement. 93

Homophobia, PUBLIC EYE, Mar. 1993, at 9 (quoting Kevin Tebedo, Executive Director of
CFV). Tebedo claimed
[Amendment 2] is about whose authority takes precedence in the society in
which we live ... [The] authority of God? The authority of the supreme King
of Kings and Lord of Lords? You see, we say we should have the separation of
church and state, but you see, Jesus Christ is the King of Kings and the Lord of
Lords. That is politics; that is rule; that is authority."
Id.
188. See Daniel A. Batterman, Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political Process,
Levels of Generality and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29
NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 933-34 (1995) (commenting that CFV attempted to garner
support for Amendment 2 through the use of broader "civil rights" rhetoric).
1 89. Id. at 934 (quoting Will Perkins, chairman of CFV, who appeared on Crossfire
stating "[y]ou know very well ... that affirmative action is just a logical progression of
civil rights.") (CNN television broadcast, Dec. 22, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, CNN File)).
190. See Grauerholz, supra note 1, at 848. Grauerholz quoted CFV campaign
material, which described the purpose of Amendment 2 as "protecting 'traditional
family values and structures,' safeguarding children from sexual molestation, protecting
'individuals' rights to view homosexuality as immoral,' preventing dissolution of civil
rights protection for 'authentic minorities,' diminishing the cost for treatment of AIDS
and its 'deadly consequences,' and furthering the view that homosexuality is curable."
Id. (citing Plaintiffs-Appellees' Answer Brief, at 10-11, Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270
(Colo. 1993) (No. 93SA17)). Grauerholz also remarked that CFV further supported these
purposes by maintaining that "gays and lesbians 'threaten[ed] . . . to undermine
traditional family values and structures' because if homosexuals were allowed to marry,
the traditional family structure would dissolve, insurance rates increase, and children, as
'wretched victims of such marriages' would become miserable." Id.
19 1. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 24 (identifying CFV as Amendment 2's sponsor).
192. See Evans (b), 854 P.2d at 1272.
193. See id.
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B. Evans I(a) and (b)
1. Evans 1(a): The Trial Court
On November 12, 1992, Richard G. Evans led a group of
plaintiffs' 94 in filing suit in a Colorado district court for the County of
Denver to enjoin the enforcement of Amendment 2.'9' The petitioners
claimed that Amendment 2 violated their Fourteenth Amendment right
to equal protection 196 because it failed to "rationally advance a
legitimate governmental interest and because it place[d] unique
burdens" on the ability of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals "to participate
equally in the political process. ' 97
While the trial court initially rejected the plaintiffs request for an
expedited hearing on the merits, the plaintiffs quickly moved for a
preliminary injunction. 98 Granting the injunction, the court
recognized that Amendment 2 unfairly burdened the rights of an
identifiable group-homosexuals.' 99 The court also found that
Amendment 2 violated a fundamental right which forbids states from
194. See supra note 13 for a complete list of the plaintiffs.
195. See Evans l(a), 1993 WL 19678.
196. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1272-73 n.2. See also supra Part lI.B (discussing equal
protection and the Fourteenth Amendment).
197. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1272-73 n.2. See also Evans 1(a), 1993 WL 19678, at
*4 (plaintiffs argues that they would be denied 'the right to vote and the right to petition
the government for redress of grievances").
198. See Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1273. In making its ruling on the injunction, the
trial court applied the six-part test set forth in Rathke v. MacFarlane,648 P.2d 648,
653-54 (Colo. 1982), to determine whether the plaintiffs had met the burden required for
the preliminary injunction. Evans l(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *7-8. Under the Rathke
test, a court may grant a preliminary injunction only if the moving party demonstrates
that it needs the injunctive relief to protect property rights or an existing fundamental
constitutional right. Rathke, 648 P.2d at 652. The judge must also find: (1) the
movants possess a legitimate chance to win the case on the merits; (2) the plaintiffs
may suffer irreparable injury which injunctive relief may prevent; (3) no adequate legal
remedy exists; (4) the injunction would not disserve the public interest; (5) the "balance
of equities" favors granting the injunction; and (6) "the injunction will preserve the
status quo pending a trial on the merits." Id. at 653-54. If the judge does not find the
movant satisfied these criteria, the judge should refuse to grant injunctive relief. Id. at
654.
In light of Rathke, the trial court found the Evans plaintiffs sufficiently supported
their claim. Evans l(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *12.
The Evans 1(a) court specifically recognized that the plaintiffs had satisfied the Rathke
test by demonstrating that Amendment 2 infringed upon the fundamental Fourteenth
Amendment rights of homosexuals. Id. at *11-*12. The trial court found that
Amendment 2 burdened the fundamental constitutional right of an "independently
identifiable group . . . not to have the State endorse and give effect to private biases"
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at *9, * 11.
199. See Evans (a), 1993 WL 19678, at *11-*12.
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endorsing and giving effect to private biases.2"' According to the
court, the petitioners possessed "a reasonable probability of proving
that Amendment 2 is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt." ''
The court concluded that a trial on the merits of Amendment 2 requires
application of the strict scrutiny standard. 2
2. Evans v. Romer I(b): The Colorado Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the trial court's decision
to grant the injunction. 23 The Colorado court examined Amendment 2
in light of whether it infringed upon an existing constitutional right.' 4
The Colorado Supreme Court based its de novo review upon two
principles: (1) that "the Equal Protection Clause ... applies to all
citizens, and not simply those who are members of traditionally
'suspect' classes such as racial or ethnic minorities;, 20 5 and (2) that
200. Id. at *11. But see Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1288-89 (Erickson, J.,dissenting)
(arguing that "the district court [Evans 1(a)] erred in issuing a preliminary injunction
based on a fundamental right not to have the State endorse and give effect to private
biases," since no such fundamental right was ever recognized by the United States
Supreme Court).
201. Evans 1(a), 1993 WL 19678, at *7.
202. Id. at *12. See supra Part 11.B for an explanation of the standards of review
under the Equal Protection Clause.
203. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1272. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Colorado, the
State (representing the defendants) argued that the trial court erroneously based its
decision on an incorrect application of Rathke. Id. at 1274. The defendants disputed the
trial court's finding that "injunctive relief is necessary to protect [an] existing
fundamental constitutional right[]." Id. Further, the defendants contended that the trial
court extrapolated from, and extended the holdings of, several federal court cases to
create the right that Amendment 2 allegedly violated. Id. at 1274. The defendants
contended that the trial court did not rely on direct precedent, and merely extended the
federal cases to create the particular Constitutional right. Id.
The plaintiffs maintained that the trial court, for the most part, held correctly. Id.
Recognizing some weaknesses in the trial court's analysis, however, the plaintiffs urged
the Colorado Supreme Court to acknowledge that Amendment 2 violated the plaintiff's
fundamental right to political participation. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court
commented that:
[The plaintiffs] do not urge that we base our decision on the precise right
identified and relied on by the trial court in rendering its decision. To the
contrary, they have argued to this court that the right identified by the trial
court, when 'read in light of the arguments actually presented to [it] ...is best
construed to mean that Amendment 2 violates the plaintiffs' fundamental right
of political participation ...." In short, plaintiffs urge us to rely only on the
equal protection arguments which they have relied on, and that the trial court's
ruling should be construed to have done the same.
Id. (citation omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1275. However, the Colorado Supreme Court majority did note that, "gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals have not been found to constitute a suspect class." Id.
(citing High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th
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"[t]he right of citizens to participate in the process of government is a
core democratic value which has been recognized from the very
inception of [the] Republic up to the present time." 2'
The court first emphasized several voting rights cases, such as
Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15,207 Williams v.
Rhodes 20 8 and Reynolds v. Sims,209 all of which illustrated the value
placed upon participation in the political process." ° According to the
Colorado Supreme Court, these cases enunciated one unifying
principle: "[L]aws may not create unequal burdens on identifiable
groups with respect to the right to participate in the political process
absent a compelling state interest. '2 1
The court next highlighted cases involving legislation which
prevented political institutions from enacting "legislation desired by an
identifiable group of voters. 21 2 According to the court, these cases
applied to Evans because they stood for the proposition that the Equal
Protection Clause affords all identifiable groups the fundamental
Cir. 1990) (asserting that homosexuals constituted neither a suspect nor quasi-suspect
class)). The Colorado court also noted that the plaintiffs never asserted homosexuals
composed such a class. Id.
206. Id. at 1276.
207. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). See supra text accompanying notes 151-55 for a
summary of Kramer. In Evans 1(b), the majority commented that Kramer "clearly
demonstrate[d] the danger presented by such restrictive legislation [in] that it may deny
[citizens] 'any effective voice in the governmental affairs which substantially affect
their lives."' Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1277 (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627). Using
this idea, the majority concluded that, "to the extent that legislation impairs a group's
ability to effectively participate (which is not to be confused with successful
participation) in the process by which the government operates, close judicial scrutiny
is necessitated." Id.
208. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text for a
summary of Williams. The Evans l(b) court noted that the United States Supreme Court
in Williams concluded that only a compelling interest could justify "Ohio statutes which
'made it virtually impossible,' for new political parties with widespread support, or an
old party which enjoyed very little support, to be placed on the state ballot .... Evans
l(b), 854 P.2d at 1278 (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 24).
209. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See supra text accompanying notes 169-76 for a
discussion of Reynolds. According to the Colorado Supreme Court, Reynolds "reflects
the [United States Supreme Court's] judgment that dilution in the effectiveness of certain
voters' exercise of the franchise violates the guarantee of equal protection of the laws
not simply because citizens are guaranteed the right to vote, but because that right must
be preserved in a meaningful and effective manner." Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1278.
210. Id. at 1276.
211. Id. at 1279.
212. Id. These cases included: Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458
U.S. 457 (1982); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971); and Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S.
385 (1969). See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hunter.
See supra note 161 for a discussion of Washington and Gordon.
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constitutional right to participate equally in the political process. 21 3
The Colorado Supreme Court first cited Hunter v. Erickson21 4 to
demonstrate the fundamental right to participate equally in the political
process.2t5 Second, the Evans I(b) court recognized that Washington
v. Seattle School District No. 1216 held that certain democratically
enacted legislation "impermissibly interfered with the political process
and unlawfully burdened the efforts of minority groups to secure
public benefits. '21 7 According to the Evans 1(b) court, Washington
effectively meant that courts should view laws that allocate power
based on something other than "general principle[s]" as
constitutionally suspect. 218 Thus, the Evans 1(b) majority concluded
that both Hunter and Washington applied outside purely racial contexts
and directly to Amendment 2.219 Third, the Evans I(b) court discussed
Gordon v. Lance,22 since it specifically invoked Hunter

as further

proof that the United States Supreme Court never intended for Hunter
to stand solely for racial issues.222 Gordon, along with Hunter and
Washington, led the Evans I(b) majority to decide that "these facts
clearly support the conclusion that Hunter applies to a broad spectrum
of discriminatory legislation. 223
213. Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1279-81.
214. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
215. Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1279-80 (noting the Court in Hunter concluded that a
government could neither make it more difficult for a particular group to enact
legislation nor could the government weaken or dilute the vote of an individual).
216. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
217. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1280 (citing Washington, 458 U.S. at 467-70).
218. Id. at 1281. See also Robert J. Wagner, Evans v. Romer: Colorado Amendment
2 and the Search for a Fundamental Right for Groups to ParticipateEqually in the
Political Process, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 523, 536 (Winter 1993/1994) (claiming that the
Colorado Supreme Court used Washington to support its idea that Amendment 2 unfairly
allocated voting power).
219. See Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1281. The Colorado court reasoned:
Thus, while Washington, like Hunter involved an initiative that affected a
racial minority, and while this fact weighed heavily in the [United States
Supreme] Court's consideration of this case, it would be erroneous to conclude
that the 'neutral principle' precept is applicable only in the context of racial
discrimination. Indeed, such a reading of Hunter and Washington would be
antithetical to the neutral principle itself ....
Id.
220. 403 U.S. 1 (1971).
221. Id. at 5.
222. Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1282. In support of its belief that Hunter applies
beyond purely racial issues, the Colorado court claimed that the Supreme Court would not
have mentioned Hunter in Gordon if the Supreme Court intended to limit Hunter to race
issues. Id.
223. Id. The Evans l(b) court stated, "[T]he Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution protects the fundamental right to participate equally in the political
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Consequently, the Evans 1(b) court rejected the defendants'
argument that it should refuse to compare homosexual rights with
other minority rights, even though homosexuals did not compose a
suspect class. 224 The Evans 1(b) court ruled that, to a reasonable
probability, Amendment 2 infringed upon the plaintiffs' fundamental
right to participate equally in the political process because it "expressly
fence[d] out an independently identifiable group" 225 and because it
"prohibit[ed] this class of persons from seeking governmental action
favorable to it [by barring homosexual rights from legislation]. 226
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court, despite a vigorous dissent, 2 7
ultimately held that courts should examine Amendment 2 under the
standard of strict scrutiny.228 The Colorado Supreme Court then
remanded the Evans I(b) case to the trial court to determine whether the
government crafted Amendment 2 narrowly enough to meet a
compelling state interest. 229

process, and that any legislation or state constitutional amendment which infringes on
this right by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of persons must be subject
to strict judicial scrutiny." Id.
224. See id. at 1284.
225. Id. at 1285.
226. Id.
227. See generally id. at 1286-1302 (Erickson, J.,dissenting). In the dissent,
Justice Erickson asserted that homosexuals failed to constitute a "suspect class." See id.
at 1291 (Erickson, J.,dissenting). Moreover, Justice Erickson rejected the Colorado
Supreme Court majority's holding that Amendment 2 infringed upon a fundamental
constitutional right by relying on a philosophy of judicial restraint instead of
expansion. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting). Using the United States Supreme Court cases
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) and James v.
Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), to support his position, Justice Erickson claimed that
the Colorado Supreme Court should read Hunter in a narrow race-related context. Evans
l(b), 854 P.2d at 1300 (Erickson, J.,dissenting). The James case distinguished Hunter
by stating that Hunter applied to a "constitutionally suspect class" which did not exist
in James. James, 402 U.S. at 141 (citing Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391-92). Similarly,
Justice Erickson contended, in Evansl(b) that homosexuals failed to constitute a
"suspect class," so the Colorado court should treat James as dispositive. Evans 1(b), 854
P.2d at 1298 (Erickson, J.,dissenting). In addition, Justice Erickson distinguished both
Gordon and Washington as cases which again dealt with issues outside the scope of
those the Colorado court considered. Id. at 1299-1301 (Erickson, J., dissenting). The
Evans l(b) majority, therefore, improperly found a fundamental right to participate
equally in the political process since the United States Supreme Court has never
articulated such a right. Id. at 1298 (Erickson, J.,dissenting). Amendment 2 thus did
not infringe upon any of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights and did not deserve strict
scrutiny review. Id. at 1301 (Erickson, J.,dissenting). Justice Erickson concluded by
stating that the trial court incorrectly granted the preliminary injunction. Id. at 1302
(Erickson, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 286.
229. Evans 11(a), 1993 WL 518586, at *2. See also Evans 11(b), 882 P.2d at 1339.
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C. Evans II(a) and (b)
1. Evans v. Romer II(a): The Trial Court
On remand, the state offered six "compelling" state interests. 230 The
trial court examined each interest. 23' In regard to the first interest, the
trial court concluded that a government desire to deter "factionalism"
merely masked "an attempt to impede the expression of a 'difference of
opinion on a controversial political question.... ,,,232 Next, the state
argued that it maintained a compelling interest in preserving the
integrity of its political functions. 233 Because the defendants'
argument lacked any clear precedent to support the allegation, the trial
court again rejected the defendants' contention.234 Moreover, the trial
court expressed doubt about the fiscal concerns the defendants
enunciated as to the extra cost incurred in enforcing these types of new
homosexual anti-discriminatory laws. 235 According to the trial court,
both preventing government interference in personal lives and
236
protecting religious liberty did constitute compelling state interests.
However, the trial court stated that Amendment 2 failed to narrowly
237
"tie-in" these interests, while also unfairly burdening homosexuals.
230. Evans 11(a), 1993 WL 518586, at *2. The defendants listed six state interests
met by Amendment 2:
(1)deterring factionalism; (2) preserving the integrity of the state's political
functions; (3) preserving the ability of the state to remedy discrimination
against suspect classes; (4) preventing the government from interfering with
personal, familial, and religious privacy; (5) preventing government from
subsidizing the political objectives of a special interest group; and (6)
promoting the physical and psychological well-being of Colorado children.
Id. at *2-*9.
231. See id. at *2-*9.
232. Evans 11(b), 882 P.2d at 1340.
233" Evans 11(a), 1993 WL 518586, at *3.
234. Id. at *5.
235. id. at *6. The trial court concluded that the "defendants' offered evidence of lack
of fiscal ability [was] unpersuasive in all respects." Id.
236. Id. at *7.
237. Id. at *8. The trial court suggested a more limited approach to protecting
religious liberty than the one offered by Amendment 2: "The narrowly focused way of
addressing [anti-discrimination protections for gay men, lesbians and bisexuals] is to
add to it a religious exemption such as is found in the Denver and Aspen ordinances, not
to deny gays and bisexuals their fundamental right of participation in the political
process." Id. at *7. In regard to a personal issue, the defendants failed to define the term
"family." Id. at *8. Furthermore, the trial court rejected the personal privacy interest by
stating that "[tihe general issue of whether personal privacy is a compelling state
interest was not adequately established." Id. The court stated it could only speculate as
to what defendants meant by personal privacy and how Amendment 2 protected such a
right. Id. The court also denied the interest concerning the subsidizing of a special
interest group since that argument lacked any tangible support or credible defenses. Id.
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Consequently, the trial court permanently enjoined Amendment 2.238
2. Evans v. Romer I1(b): The Colorado Supreme Court
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court supported the lower court's
evidentiary findings and upheld the permanent enjoinment of
Amendment 2.239 Like the trial court, the Colorado Supreme Court
noted that the defendants failed to narrowly tailor Amendment 2 to
support the alleged compelling state interests. 24" Thus, the court
affirmed the trial court's permanent injunction barring Amendment 2s
enforcement.24 '
D. Romer v. Evans: Romer III-UnitedStates Supreme Court
1. Majority Opinion
In 1996, when Romer v. Evans came before the United States
Supreme Court, the Court framed the issue before it as an issue of first
impression: 242 Is a law which disqualifies "a class of persons from the
Finally, the court dismissed the protection of children component because the
defendants never presented evidence in support of this compelling state interest. Id. at
*9.

238. Id. at *13.
239. Evans 11(b), 882 P.2d at 1350. In Evans 11(b), the defendants maintained that:
(1)the Colorado Supreme Court should reconsider the legal standard it set forth in the
first Evans case for assessing the constitutionality of Amendment 2; (2) several
compelling state interests support Amendment 2 and the Amendment is narrowly
tailored to meet these interests; (3) the Colorado Supreme Court could sever the
unconstitutional portions of the Amendment from the remainder; and (4) Amendment 2
constitutes a valid exercise of state power under the Tenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Id. at 1341.
240. Id. at 1342-50. The Colorado Supreme Court adopted much of the lower court's
rationale and affirmed the trial court's permanent enjoinment of Amendment 2 without
any significant modifications to the ruling. Id. at 1350. However, Justice Erickson,
again the lone dissenter, felt that the Colorado Supreme Court should have used a
rational basis standard of review for Amendment 2. Id. at 1366 (Erickson, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Justice Erickson disagreed with the majority by finding that the
defendants adequately demonstrated and supported their arguments concerning how
Amendment 2 protected religious freedom, encouraged statewide uniformity in the law
(discouraged factionalism) and eased the state's fiscal burdens. Id. (Erickson, J.,
dissenting). Justice Erickson asserted that the trial court erred in its decision and that
the Colorado Supreme Court should have vacated the injunction. Id. (Erickson, J.,
dissenting).
241. Id. at 1350.
242. Prior to the Amendment 2 question, the United States Supreme Court had
previously recognized the need to balance Fourteenth Amendment protections against
the fact that much legislation incidentally disadvantages various groups. Romer 111, 116
S. Ct. at 1627. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979);
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). These cases demonstrated
that the Court would uphold legislation which neither burdens a fundamental right nor
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right to seek specific protection[s] from the law" constitutional?243
Amendment 2 posed such a unique challenge that the Court decided to
review Amendment 2 with "careful consideration to determine whether
. . . [it is] obnoxious to the [C]onstitution[]." 24 Holding that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Court cited much of
the Colorado's Supreme Court's opinion. 5 Ultimately, however, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court's
ruling based on a different rationale.24
The United States Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 denied
equal protection of the laws in the most "literal sense" 247 because it
imposed a broad disability on one particular group-homosexuals.248
However, the Court did not choose to explicitly classify homosexuals
as a suspect class. 249 Thus, unlike the Colorado Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court did not apply strict scrutiny.2 50 Rather,
the Court fashioned its analysis of Amendment 2 around the rational
basis test. 21
a. Amendment 2 Has No Rational Relationship
to a Legitimate State Interest
Demonstrating that the rational basis test is not a foregone
conclusion of the constitutionality of state legislation, the Court held
that Amendment 2 failed the rational basis test. 25 2 First, the majority
targets a suspect class as long as the legislation bears a rational relation to some
legitimate end. Romer I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. To support its conclusion, the Supreme
Court cited Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) for the proposition that it will uphold a
law that bears a rational relation to a legitimate state interest as long as the law does not
burden a fundamental right or target a suspect class. Romer I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1627
(citing Heller, 509 U.S. at 319-21).
243. Romer I1, 116 S.Ct. at 1628.
244. Id. (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 227 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
245. See generally id. at 1624-29 for the majority's opinion and its partial use of the
Colorado Supreme Court's reasoning.
246. Id. at 1624.
247. Id. at 1628.
248. Id. at 1626-27.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 1627.
251. Id.
252. Id. The Court commented that Amendment 2 "fails, indeed defies, even this
[rational relations] conventional inquiry." Id. To amplify its point, the Court cited a
plethora of cases in which it upheld controversial laws that demonstrated a rational
relationship to a governmental interest. Id. at 1627. The Court cited the following
cases: New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (ruling that tourism benefits justified
a classification favoring pushcart vendors of certain longevity); Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (assuming health concerns justified law
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held that the Amendment imposed a disability on a "single, named
'
group."253
Second, the Court held that Amendment 2 lacked a rational
relation to any legitimate governmental interest.254 In support of its
opinion, the Court rejected the State's argument that Amendment 2
legitimately protected a citizen's right to freedom of association,
particularly of those citizens who possessed a personal or religious
objection to homosexuality. 5 In addition, the Court rejected the
State's assertion that the Court should conserve resources to battle
discrimination against other truly suspect classes.256
According to the Court, Colorado drafted Amendment 2 based on
animosity toward homosexuals.2 7 The Court reasoned that a bare
desire to harm a politically unpopular group does not constitute a
legitimate state interest. 258 As a result, the majority concluded that
favoring optometrists over opticians); Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949) (holding that potential traffic hazards justified an exemption of
vehicles advertising the owner's products from a general advertising ban); Kotch v.
Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947) (reasoning that a licensing
scheme that disfavored persons unrelated to current river boat pilots was justified by
possible efficiency and safety benefits of a closely knit pilotage system). Romer 11I,
116 S.Ct. at 1627. The Court also stated that the legislatures drew the laws in these
cases narrowly and closely tied them to a rationally related, legitimate governmental
purpose. Id. By ensuring that the legislation maintained a close relation to a
compelling interest, the Court prevented legislatures from creating classifications
designed solely to disadvantage the specific group burdened by the law. Id. at 1627.
253. Romer II!, 116 S.Ct. at 1627.
254. Id. According to the majority opinion, Amendment 2 imposed a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single group, and the Amendment's "sheer breadth" failed
to fit within the state's proffered interests, thereby suggesting that animus served as the
actual motivation for the Amendment. Id.
255. Id. at 1629.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1628. The majority noted that the Amendment seemed inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class it affects. Id. The Court relied on Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973), for the proposition that legislation
created to harm a particular politically unpopular group fails to constitute a legitimate
governmental interest. Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1628. The Court suggested that "[i]f the
constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot
constitute a legitimate governmental interest." Id. at 1628 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S.
at 534). By making a general retraction of specific protections for gays and lesbians,
the Court determined the Amendment would inflict real injuries that "outrun and belie any
legitimate justifications" the government may claim for it. Id. at 1628-29.
Consequently, the majority reiterated that Amendment 2 lacked any rational relation to a
legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 1629. The majority stated: "[A] law must bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose, and Amendment 2 does
not." Id. (citing Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988) (noting the
proposition that a law must rationally relate to a legitimate governmental purpose)
(citation omitted)).
258. Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1628 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (1973)).
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Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause by subordinating
homosexuals' interests to those of other citizens, while also failing to
further a legitimate state interest.259
To further support its holding, the Court emphasized that Davis v.
Beason260 cannot be looked to as good law. 26' Although Davis upheld
as constitutional a law which discriminated against polygamists, 62 the
Court argued that it was substantially overruled by the Brandenburg
decision.263 Thus, the Court focused its inquiry on whether
Amendment 2 improperly prevented homosexuals from participating in
the political process. 6
b. The Effect of Amendment 2 on Homosexuals'
Participation in the Political Process
The United States Supreme Court asserted that Amendment 2
broadly prohibited all legislative action, by state and local
governments, designed to protect the named class-homosexuals.265
In addition, according to the Court, the Amendment did more than
merely deny homosexuals special protections.266 In the Court's
interpretation, Amendment 2 actually withdrew "legal protection[s]
from the injuries caused by discrimination" from only homosexuals
and no others.267
259. Id. at 1629.
260. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
261. See Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1628. See generally id. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) for the dissent's reliance on Davis. See supra text accompanying notes 3445 for a discussion of Davis.
262. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Davis.
263. Romer I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1628 (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam)). The Court asserted that Brandenburg overruled Davis by holding
that governments may not deny the right to vote to persons who advocate a certain
practice (polygamy in Davis). Id. Further, the Court noted that regardless of the holding
in Davis, a statute depriving a person of the right to vote based on their status will
likely not survive a strict scrutiny challenge. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972) (stating that the right to vote is a fundamental right)).
264 . Id.
265. Id. The United States Supreme Court relied on findings from the Colorado
Supreme Court to validate its opinion. Id. In delivering its opinion, the Supreme Court
quoted the Colorado court as stating: "The immediate objective of Amendment 2 is, at a
minimum, to repeal existing statutes, regulations, ordinances and policies of state and
local entities that barred discrimination based on sexual orientation ....

The 'ultimate

effect' of Amendment 2 is to prohibit any governmental entity from adopting similar, or
more protective statutes, regulations, ordinances or policies in the future unless the state
constitution is first amended to permit such measures." Id. at 1624-25 (quoting Evans
1(b), 854 P.2d at 1284-85 & n.26) (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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The Court then reviewed Amendment 2's effect on the private
sector. 68 The majority noted that the laws which Amendment 2
nullified protected "enumerated" groups, 269 to whom the Court had not
yet granted heightened equal protection scrutiny. 270 Amendment 2,
according to the Court, applied unfairly because it: (1) barred
legislatures from enacting specific protections for homosexuals from
discrimination, 27' and (2) invalidated legal protections for
homosexuals in all transactions dealing with "housing, sale of real
estate, insurance,
health and welfare services, private education, and
272
employment."
The Court explained that Amendment 2 also affected the public
sphere by repealing and prohibiting all laws which protected
homosexuals from discrimination by the state government.273 In
addition to the Amendment clearly nullifying the specific laws that
protected homosexuals, the Court noted that a "fair, if not necessary"
inference regarding the Amendment's broad language demonstrated
that the Amendment also stripped homosexuals of any protections
provided by general laws which prohibited arbitrary discrimination in
both the public and private sectors. 4
The Supreme Court rejected the notion that Amendment 2 merely
repealed "special protections., 275 To the contrary, the Court held that
Amendment 2 actually imposed special disabilities upon
homosexuals.2 7 6 While others enjoyed safeguards against
'268. Id. See supra note 7 for a summation of the local municipalities' laws and
ordinances in regard to the protections they grant homosexuals within the housing,
employment, and general commercial industry.
269. Romer I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1625. In describing the ordinances, the Court
emphasized the importance of the municipalities actually enumerating the protections
granted by commenting that "[e]numeration is the essential device used to make the duty
not to discriminate concrete and to provide guidance for those who must comply." Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1626.
272. Id. The majority opinion further ruled that Amendment 2 also effectively
repealed all laws and policies that provided specific protection for homosexuals from
discrimination at every level of the Colorado government. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. In Amendment 2's defense, the State principally argued that Amendment 2
placed homosexuals in the same position as other people and merely denied them special
rights. Id. at 1624. Also, the Petitioner contended that Amendment 2 merely
safeguarded citizens' "freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords
or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality." Id. at
1629. The Petitioner further suggested that enforcing protections for homosexuals
would limit the resources which the government could allocate to battle discrimination
against truly "suspect classes." Id.
275. Id. at 1628.
276. Id. at 1626-27.
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discrimination,277 homosexuals could only receive protection by
rallying the general electorate to repeal Amendment 2. 278 The Court
held that this option constituted an extremely daunting task which
effectively limited homosexual voting power. 279 Thus, the Court
upheld the permanent enjoinment of Amendment 2 on the ground that
it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution.280
2. The Dissent
a. The Political Battle Surrounding Amendment 2
The dissent, led by Justice Scalia, opened by stating that the
majority erred because it failed to recognize that the battle over
Amendment 2 constituted a "Kulturkampf" 28'-a conflict between civil
government and religious authorities.282 Moreover, the dissent
rejected the Court's analysis of Amendment 2 as the "manifestation of
a 'bare . . . desire to harm' homosexuals. 283 Rather, the dissent
viewed the Amendment as a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the
laws. 284
The dissent strongly disagreed with the Court's position that
opposition to homosexuality is tantamount to religious or racial
prejudice. 85 The dissent further claimed that the majority lacked the
right to condemn and label opposition or "animosity" to homosexuality
277. Id. at 1627. The Court reasoned that Amendment 2 restricted protections taken
for granted by most people either because they already possessed them or did not need
them. Id. Moreover, these protections constituted critical measures which defended
against exclusion from a large number of transactions and endeavors that occurred in
ordinary civic life in a free society. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id.
280. See generally id. at 1627-29.
281. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
282.

WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 667 (1983).

283. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia J., dissenting).
284. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead of a mere equal protection issue, the dissent
viewed Romer as a political battle between a minority that attempted to change society's
opinions versus a tolerant majority that desired to maintain the status quo. Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting). The dissent also claimed that Colorado enacted Amendment 2 using
"unimpeachable" methods validated by both the Court and Congress. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). According to the dissent, this is why the majority needed to rely mostly on
"principles of righteousness rather than judicial holdings" to discredit the Amendment.
Id.(Scalia, J., dissenting).
285. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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as evil.286 According to the dissent, the Constitution never expressly
28 7
protected homosexual rights, unlike those of other minorities.
Consequently, the dissent suggested that the general electorate should
determine whether to protect these rights.288 In its opinion, the dissent
stated that the Colorado electorate did not violate the Equal Protection
Clause when it enacted Amendment 2.2 9
b. Equal Protection Under Amendment 2
The dissent attacked the majority's rejection of the State's contention
that Amendment 2 merely "put[] gays and lesbians in the same position
as all other persons" by denying them special rights.2 Citing to the
Colorado Supreme Court's opinion in Evans H(b),29' the dissent
reasoned that "'general laws and policies that prohibit arbitrary
discrimination' would continue to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of homosexual conduct as well. 292 According to the dissent,
therefore, Amendment 2 did, in fact, preclude homosexuals from
receiving special treatment.293
286. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
287. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia commented:
Since the Constitution of the United States says nothing about this subject, it
is left to be resolved by normal democratic means, including the democratic
adoption of provisions in state constitutions. This Court has no business
imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from
which the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing that
"animosity" toward homosexuality ... is evil.
Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
289. See id. (Scalia, J.dissenting).
290. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
291. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). To support its contention that Amendment
2 will only affect special homosexual protections, the dissent quoted the Colorado
Supreme Court from Evans 11(b) as follows: "'[I]t
is significant to note that Colorado
law currently proscribes discrimination against persons who are not suspect classes. Of
course Amendment 2 is not intended to have any effect on this legislation, but seeks
only to prevent the adoption of anti-discrimination laws intended to protect gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals."' Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans 11(b), 882 P.2d at
1346 n.9) (citations omitted) (emphasis added by Justice Scalia).
292. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that the Colorado court's
decision noted that the current anti-discriminatory laws would still serve to protect
homosexuals.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Thus, in Justice Scalia's opinion,
Amendment 2 merely prohibited special treatment of homosexuals. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
293. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting). For example, according to the dissent, a business
must pay homosexuals their pensions, just like every other employee; however,
Amendment 2 would prevent the state or any municipality from making death-benefit
payments to a "life-partner" of a homosexual since it does not make such payments to
the long-time roommate of non-homosexuals. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent
also stated that homosexuals can purchase the same auto insurance as everyone else, but
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Further, the dissent asserted that the majority erred by
misconstruing the denial of equal treatment. 4 The dissent claimed
that the majority insisted that Amendment 2 denied homosexuals equal
treatment because they cannot receive "preferentialtreatment without
amending the state constitution. 295 In other words, the dissent alleged
that the majority based its opinion on the notion that any law denies a
person equal protection if he cannot obtain "preferentialtreatment
under the laws" 296 as easily as others even if that person received
otherwise equal treatment under the law. 297 Consequently, the dissent
asserted that 298Amendment 2 did not deny equal protection to
homosexuals.
Next, the dissent alleged that the majority ignored the fact that a
legitimate, rational basis existed for the prohibition of these special
protections for homosexuals. 29 In support of its position, the dissent
emphasized that the Supreme Court's own decision in Bowers v.
Hardwick300 held that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from
making homosexual conduct a crime. 30 ' Hence, the dissent surmised
neither the state nor any municipality could require an insurance company to ignore the
distinctive health risks associated with homosexuality. id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the dissent argued that the majority failed to dispute the dissent's allegation
that Amendment 2 will most likely not adversely affect most protections. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
294. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
295. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
296. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the majority rationale
implied that whenever an Act imposed a disadvantage or failed to confer a benefit on a
particular group, the Act denied equal protection to that group. Id. at 1630-31 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). For example, the dissent compared this situation to one where the state
passed a law prohibiting nepotism. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to
the majority's logic, the electorate's vote would deny equal protections to a civil
servant's family members since the family members must now persuade the electorate to
repeal the law if the family members wish to receive the benefit of city contracts. Id.
(Scalia, J.,dissenting). The dissent rejected this notion as a denial of Equal Protection
dissenting).
and referred to the Court's theory as "unheard-of." Id. (Scalia, J.,
297. Id. at 1630 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). Justice Scalia contended:
The central thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal
protection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid disadvantage),
it must have recourse to a more general and hence more difficult level of
political decisionmaking than others. The world has never heard of such a
principle, which is why the Court's opinion is so long on emotive utterance
and so short on relevant legal citation.
Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
298. Id. at 1631 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
299. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
300. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes 57-64 for a
discussion of Bowers.
116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
301. Romer I!!,
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that a state, which may criminalize 3homosexual
conduct, can indeed
02
it.
disfavor
merely
which
laws
enact
The dissent then rejected the argument that Bowers did not apply
because "a greater-includes-the-lesser" rationale failed to justify
Amendment 2's application to people who do not "engage in
homosexual acts,"
but who merely espouse a homosexual
"orientation. ' ' Relying on Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati,°4 the dissent noted that some courts
have held that it is "virtually impossible" to distinguish between people
with a particular orientation toward homosexuality from people who
engage in homosexual activity. 35 However, even assuming that
Amendment 2's reference to a person of homosexual "orientation"
means a person who possesses a tendency to, but does not actually
engage in, homosexual conduct, the dissent maintained that Bowers
still established a rational basis for Amendment 2.
After applying Bowers, the dissent added that legislation which
failed to perfectly define a particular class does not necessarily violate

302. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting). Scalia stated, "[a]fter all, there can hardly be more
palpable discrimination against a class than making the conduct that defines the class
criminal." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103
(1987)). See supra text accompanying notes 126-33 for a summary of Padula. Thus,
according to Justice Scalia, it is constitutionally permissible for a state to adopt a
provision not even disfavoring homosexual conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels
of state government from bestowing special protections upon homosexual conduct.
Romer 1I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
303. Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S.Ct. 2519 (1996).
See supra text accompanying notes 134-44 for the facts of Equality Found. v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
305. Romer I1, 116 S.Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Equality Found.,
54 F.3d at 267). Moreover, the dissent commented that the Colorado Supreme Court
also noted the difficulty in separating these groups. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
dissent quoted the Colorado court as saying that:
Amendment 2 target[ed] this class of persons based on four characteristics:
sexual orientation; conduct; practices; and relationships. Each characteristic
provides a potentially different way of identifying that class of persons who
are gay, lesbian, or bisexual. These four characteristics are not truly severable
from one another because each provides nothing more than a different way of
identifying the same class of persons.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Evans ll(b), 882 P.2d at 1349-50) (emphasis added
by Justice Scalia).
306. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that "[i]f it is rational to
criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to deny special favor and protection to
those with a self-avowed tendency or desire to engage in the conduct. Indeed, where
criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual 'orientation' is an acceptable stand-in
for homosexual conduct." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the Equal Protection Clause. 0 7 Thus, the dissent contended that the
Court incorrectly nullified Amendment 2 merely because the Colorado
legislature could have drawn it more precisely to include only those
persons with a homosexual "orientation" who actually engaged in
homosexual activities.0 8
Even assuming, arguendo, that the majority correctly determined
that the provision regarding homosexual "orientation" was invalid, the
dissent agreed that the respondent's facial challenge nonetheless
failed.30 9 The dissent emphasized that a facial challenge to a law
requires a challenger to demonstrate that the law is not valid under any
circumstances. 3'0 Because, in its opinion, Bowers established the
validity of Amendment 2, the dissent
argued that the respondents failed
31 1
proof.
of
burden
their
to meet
c. Amendment 2 as a Valid Exercise of Democratic Principles
The Romer III dissent additionally objected to the majority's
characterization of the Colorado electorate's "animus"-filled3" 2

307. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, the dissent cited New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (policy barring hiring of methadone
users even though some methadone users may not pose a threat to passenger safety), and
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (mandatory police
retirement age of 50 does not violate equal protection even though the Act may
prematurely end the careers of some competent officers), to demonstrate imperfect
classifications that did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at
1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. Romer I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent referred to a
previous court of appeals opinion in which Justice Kennedy wrote:
Nearly any statute which classifies people may be irrational as applied in
particular cases. Discharge of the particular plaintiffs before us would be
rational, under minimal scrutiny, not because their particular cases present the
dangers which justify Navy policy, but instead because the general policy of
discharging all homosexuals [from the Navy] is rational.
Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Beller v. Mittendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 808-09
(9th Cir. 1980)). See supra text accompanying notes 118-25 for a discussion of Belier.
309. Romer I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 10. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745
(1987)).
311. Id. at 1632-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting). However, the dissent admitted that
people who possess a homosexual "orientation," but refuse to engage in homosexual
conduct, may present an applied challenge and most likely win. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In Romer 11, however, none of the respondents claimed such status. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 12. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia referred to
the majority's use of the word "animus" as suggesting that the Colorado voters, because
they voted in favor of Amendment 2, hated and maintained ill-will towards homosexuals.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rationale in creating Amendment 2. While the dissent acknowledged
that, although one person should never hate another, a person may
find another's conduct reprehensible.3t 4 In the present case, the
dissent stated that the only31 5"animus" dealt with the "moral disapproval
of homosexual conduct.,
Further, the dissent suggested that even though Coloradans are
entitled to be hostile towards homosexual conduct, Amendment 2 does
not actually reflect intense hostility. a 6 While Amendment 2 prohibited
giving homosexuals favored treatment because of their homosexuality,
they could still receive favored treatment for other reasons (i.e., as
senior citizens). 3 7 Additionally, the dissent found it comical that the
majority portrayed Coloradans as "hate-filled 'gay-bash[ers],' 3 8
considering that Colorado repealed anti-sodomy laws in 1971.' 19
3 13. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 14. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). For example, Justice Scalia observed that most
people find murder, polygamy and cruelty to animals as reprehensible conduct that they
profess animosity towards. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
315. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that this "moral disapproval"
formed the basis of society's criminal law-the same criminal law that the Court held
constitutional in Bowers. Romer II, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).. The
dissent further refuted the majority's argument by suggesting that certain laws will
always disfavor some particular group. See id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
addition, certain laws will make special protections for certain types of people difficult
to obtain. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia listed drug addicts, smokers and
gun owners as examples of other groups that face the same type of disfavorable
legislation. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent mentioned the Eighteenth
Amendment's creation of prohibition as an action which left alcohol drinkers with the
daunting task of trying to amend the United States Constitution, not merely the
Colorado Constitution, to get their privileges returned. Id. at 1634-35 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
316. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
317. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
318. After chiding the majority for "verbally disparaging as bigotry adherence to
traditional attitudes," the dissent then suggested that the Court chose to make the issue a
"culture war[ ]" and chose to side with the "knights rather than the villeins." Id. at 1637
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The dictionary defines "villein" as: "in essence plebeians, but
free men at the time of feudalism-low class and free with respect to all others but feudal
lords." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1983) at 1315. Furthermore, in
its conclusion, the dissent made veiled references to the majority as elitists. See Romer
I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia wrote that the Court's
attitude reflected "the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court's
Members are drawn." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
319. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1971 Colo. Sess.
Laws, ch. 121, § 1). This action, however, according to the dissent, does not necessarily
stand for the proposition that the general society now approved of homosexuality nor
abandoned the view that homosexuality is morally wrong. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Rather, for the dissent, the repealing of anti-sodomy laws created many inconsistencies
within society. See id. at 1633-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent alleged that
homosexuals reside in disproportionate numbers in certain communities, thus
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However, the dissent also reiterated its position that the Supreme
Court should allow those same Coloradans the opportunity to enact
legislation 32 0 which espoused a view more in line with their own
morality.32'
To further support its argument, the dissent compared Amendment 2
with laws regulating another sexually and morally divisive issue:
polygamy.322 In particular, the dissent demonstrated the similarities
323
between the socio-political status of homosexuals and polygamists
establishing a strong power base. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, I., dissenting) (citing to Record,
Exh. MMM, affidavit of Prof. James Hunter, as proof of homosexual attempts to gain a
political power base and pass favorable legislation). With this power, the dissent
argued that homosexuals attempted to encourage legislatures to enact many more
favorable pieces of legislation and to "move the center of public discourse along a
continuum from the rhetoric of disapprobation, to rhetoric of tolerance, and finally to
affirmation." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical
Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay Rights Movement, 1969-1991, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 723, 724 (1993)).
320. Justice Scalia pointed out to the Court that the Colorado electorate validly and
democratically chose to support Amendment 2. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia also commented that he "think[s] it no business of the courts (as opposed
to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war. But the Court today has done
so." Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated, "homosexuals are
entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their moral sentiments as are the
rest of society. But they are subject to being countered by lawful, democratic
countermeasures as well." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though, according to the dissent,
Amendment 2 also preserved reasonable, traditional moral American values. Id. (Scalia,
J., dissenting). While discussing the Court's opinion regarding people who dislike and
disapprove of homosexuality, the dissent noted that one might compare the Court's
"stern disapproval of 'animosity' towards homosexuality" with an earlier Court
decision, Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885), which rejected a constitutional
challenge to a statute that disadvantaged polygamous cohabitation. Romer Ii, 116 S.
Ct. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Murphy, the Court remarked:
[C]ertainly no legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in
the founding of a free, self-governing commonwealth, fit to take rank as one
of the co-ordinate States of the Union, than that which seeks to establish it on
the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the
union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate of matrimony; the
sure foundation of all that is stable and noble in our civilization; the best
guaranty of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficent
progress in social and political improvement.
Murphy, 114 U.S. at 45.
322. Romer i1I, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Presently, the
Constitutions of the States of Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah contain
provisions stating that polygamy is "forever prohibited." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing ARIZ. CONST. art. XX, par.2; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; N.M. CONST. art. XXI, § 1;
OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1).
323. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, legislatures have singled
out polygamists and those who possess a polygamous orientation for much more severe
treatment than a mere denial of favored status. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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and then reminded the Court that polygamy laws, like Amendment 2,
singled out a specific group.324 The dissent observed that while the
Court invalidated Amendment 2, anti-polygamy laws remain
constitutional, 325 thus begging the question of whether polygamists
possessed less rights than homosexuals.326 Moreover, Amendment 2
created mild consequences when contrasted with anti-polygamy laws,
some of which denied certain individuals fundamental rights.327 Since
Davis remains good law in part,328 the dissent questioned whether the
Court had concluded that the social harm of polygamy constituted a
legitimate concern of the government, while the perceived social harm

324. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
325. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). In addition, the dissent noted that Congress
conditioned the admission of Arizona, Utah, and other states into the Union on their
inclusion of anti-polygamy provisions in their respective constitutions. Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing Arizona Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 569 (1922); New Mexico Enabling
Act, 36 Stat. 558 (1954); Oklahoma Enabling Act, 34 Stat. 269 (1922); Utah Enabling
Act, 28 Stat. 108 (1958)). Justice Scalia commented:
For Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah, moreover, the Enabling Acts required that
the antipolygamy provisions be 'irrevocable without the consent of the
United States and the people of said State'-so that not only were 'each of
[the] parts' of these States not 'open on impartial terms' to polygamists, but
even the States as a whole were not; polygamists would have to persuade the
whole country to their way of thinking.
Romer I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the
voters in these states chose to outlaw polygamy. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
dissent compared these constitutionally valid, democratic Acts, which banned a
particular behavior, to the democratic passage of Amendment 2, which merely
eliminated special protections, and failed to understand why the Court in earlier
decisions upheld the anti-polygamy laws and now rejected Amendment 2. Id. at 1635-36
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. Id. at 1635 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 336
(1890) (denying the right to vote), overruled in part, Romer i11, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
The cited excerpt from Davis reads as follows:
In our judgment, § 501 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho Territory, which
provides that 'no person ... who is a bigamist or polygamist or who teaches,
advises, counsels, or encourages any person or persons to become bigamists
or polygamists or to commit any other crime defined by law, or to enter into
what is known as plural or celestial marriage, or who is a member of any order,
organization or association which teaches, advises, counsels, or encourages
its members or devotees or any other persons to commit the crime of bigamy
or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law ... is permitted to vote at any
election, or to hold any position or office of honor, trust, or profit within this
Territory,' is not open to any constitutional or legal objection.
Davis, 133 U.S. at 346-47.
328. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court
cited a part of the Davis holding with approval in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 535 (1993)).
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of homosexuality did not. 329 Thus, according to the dissent, while
Congress still refuses to grant homosexuals suspect class protection,
the Court essentially did so by rejecting Amendment 2.330
IV. ANALYSIS
Romer v. Evans established landmark precedent. 33 ' Yet the
Supreme Court wrote an ambiguous decision which lacked legal
support and failed to explicitly settle the homosexual class status
question. 332 Furthermore, the dissent, given the opportunity to
highlight the weaknesses in the majority opinion, neglected to focus on
the majority's improper rationale.333 Instead, the dissent drafted its
own version of the Romer III issue and based its argument on
principles of Justice Scalia's social conscience mixed with a modicum
of legal precedent. 334 Although the majority correctly held that
Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause, it irresponsibly
avoided deciding the issue according to traditional Constitutional
analysis. 335 The Court should have decided Romer III under the Equal
Protection Clause by either pronouncing homosexuals a suspect or
quasi-suspect class, or by enunciating a fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process. Either solution would have
created a demonstrative opinion that established unequivocal
precedent, rather than the weakly supported holding which merely
recycled tired rhetoric.
A. The FundamentalRights Approach
While the Court made interesting arguments in Romer III, its
argument lacked the legal precedent to unequivocally establish its
decision. 336 Even though Romer III is, for the most part, a case of
329. Romer II, 116 S. Ct. at 1636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
330. Id. at 1637 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Employment Non-Discrimination Act
of 1994, S. 2238, 103d Cong. (1994); Civil Rights Amendments of 1975, H.R. 5452,
94th Cong. (1975); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a)
(1988 Supp. V)).
331. See infra Part V for a discussion of the impact of the Romer III decision.
332. See Romer I!, 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (noting the majority's
"heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than judicial holdings").
333. See supra Part III.D for a discussion of the Romer III opinion.
334. See supra Part III.D for a discussion of the Romer III opinion.
335. See supra Part III.D for a discussion of the Romer III opinion.
336. See generally Romer II, 116 S. Ct. at 1620-29, for the majority opinion and an
illustration of the lack of substantial discussion of legal precedent to support the
opinion. Excluding the Colorado Supreme Court opinions (from which the majority
noted that it proposed a different rationale), the majority never relied on one case for
more than a parenthetical or short sentence. See id. Moreover, the most substantial
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"first impression," 337 the Court's opinion still lacked decisiveness and
absolute clarity.338 For example, the United States Supreme Court,
without any explanation, rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's strict
scrutiny standard 339 and instead chose the rational relations standard,
which traditionally governs gay rights cases. 34 Moreover, the Court
never fully articulated why it rejected the idea of treating homosexuals
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class and why it refused to follow the
Colorado court and decide the case in terms of a fundamental right to
participate in the political process.34'
The Supreme Court, perhaps, wished to avoid expressly confirming
the fundamental right that the Colorado Supreme Court had

case discussion occurred when the majority refuted Davis, a case upon which the dissent
heavily relied. Id. at 1628.
337. See Batterman, supra note 188, at 978 (intimating that Romer II1 is a case of
first impression before the Supreme Court in this area of gay rights). But see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), for a case that went before the Supreme Court on the
legality of homosexual conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 55-64 for a
discussion of Bowers.
3 3 8. David A. Kaplan & Daniel Klaidman, A Battle, Not the War, NEWSWEEK, June 3,
1996, at 24. The authors characterized Justice Kennedy's majority opinion as
"emotional and grand." Id. The opinion, according to Kaplan and Klaidman, read like "a
political manifesto [rather] than a piece of judicial reasoning." Id.
339. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1624. In Evans 1(b), the Colorado Supreme Court
commented that the Equal Protection Clause applies to all citizens, not just those
considered suspect classes like racial or ethnic minorities. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1275
(citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)). Also, the court recognized the
fundamental right to participate equally in the political process. Id. at 1276-77 (citing
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)). In short, the Colorado Supreme Court
asserted that "Amendment 2, to a reasonable probability, infringes on a fundamental
right protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
Amendment 2 must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny in order to determine whether it
is constitutionally valid under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 1286. See supra text
accompanying notes 203-29 for a comprehensive analysis of Evans I(b).
340. Romer Ii, 116 S. Ct. at 1627. See supra text accompanying notes 68-112. See
also supra text accompanying notes 113-44 for an examination of gay rights cases and
the courts' treatment of homosexuals; see infra note 435 for a discussion of the Defense
of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
341. See generally Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1624-29 (the Court noted that it affirmed
the Colorado Supreme Court decision (that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection
Clause) but on different grounds, and simply argued that the legislative classification
bore no rational relation to an independent and legitimate legislative end). See infra
notes 354 and 357.
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recognized.342 Yet, by all implication, it did just that.343 The Court
seemed to recognize that homosexuals lost voting power because
Amendment 2 limited their ability to enact favorable legislation.344
Amendment 2, according to the Supreme Court, prevented
homosexuals from seeking the same protections others pursued
without constraint.345 Furthermore, the Court stated that Amendment
2 "identiffied] persons by a single trait and den[ied] them protection
across the board. ' , 346 Therefore, the Court could have followed the
Colorado Supreme Court347 and applied its own decision in Kramer v.
Union Free School District No. 15348 to substantiate its opinion in
342. Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1282. After a lengthy discussion of many cases, the
Colorado Supreme Court expressly concluded that "the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution protects the fundamental right to participate equally in the
political process, and that any legislation or state constitutional amendment which
infringes on this right by 'fencing out' an independently identifiable class of persons
must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny." Id.
343. See Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1627-28; see infra note 357.
344. Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28. In its decision, the Court specifically
accepted the Colorado Court's interpretation of the Amendment: "We rely not upon our
own interpretation of the amendment but upon the authoritative construction of
Colorado's Supreme Court." Id. at 1624. As additional evidence of Amendment 2's
negative impact on homosexual voting power, the Court noted that Amendment 2
prohibited homosexuals in Colorado from obtaining any special protections, whereas
the law hindered no other group in this manner. Id. at 1627. Furthermore, the Court
apparently adopted the Colorado Supreme Court's determination about Amendment 2's
overall effect since it quoted directly from the Colorado court's conclusion. Id. at 1625.
The Colorado Supreme Court held: "The 'ultimate effect' of Amendment 2 is to prohibit
any governmental entity from adopting similar, or more protective statutes,
regulations, ordinances, or policies in the future unless the state constitution is first
amended to permit such measures." Id. (quoting Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1285).
In addition, the Supreme Court should have applied a case like Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (discussing and overruling legislation which limited
candidates from getting on the ballot). See supra text accompanying notes 162-68 for
an expanded summary of Williams. In the case of Amendment 2, for example, an
opponent may run anti-gay ads which lack any relation to the campaign, but may serve
to scare the public. A gay candidate lacks any recourse in that situation under
Amendment 2 and such ads would effectively bar the candidate.
See supra text accompanying notes 169-75 for a discussion of Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 579 (1964) (instructing that, in the context of political subdivisions and
voting districts, "[t]he vote of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of
any other citizen in the State"). Again, the Reynolds Court's holding appears to
substantiate the Supreme Court's assertion that Amendment 2 failed the rational
relations test since it limited homosexual voting power to enact favorable legislation.
345. See Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1626-27. See supra text accompanying notes 14955 for a discussion of Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969) (holding that the strict scrutiny test should apply to legislation that effectively
limits a group's ability to participate in governmental affairs).
346. Romer III, 116 S. Ct. at 1628.
347. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1285 (citing Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627).
348. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
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Romer III. In Kramer, the Court ruled that the strict scrutiny test
applies to legislation which effectively limits a group's ability to
participate in government.349 In Romer III, the Court drew that same,
specific conclusion, but chose not to support it with Kramer.350
Additionally, the Supreme Court should have followed another
Colorado Supreme Court argument by applying Hunter v. Erickson35'
to emphasize that laws which disadvantage any group by limiting their
power to enact legislation are unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause.352 Although it did not specifically mention the
Hunter case, the United States Supreme Court did cite most of the
cases upon which the Colorado Supreme Court based its interpretation
of Amendment 2.
Therefore, the United States Supreme Court
essentially used Hunter and the other Colorado Supreme Court
citations to help render its decision, but the Court stopped short of
establishing the same fundamental right of homosexuals to participate
equally in the political process.3
349. Id. at 626.
350. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1627-28.
351. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
352. See Evans i(b), 854 P.2d at 1279-82.
353. Romer II, 116 S. Ct. at 1624.
354. The Colorado court firmly established the right to participate equally in the
political process. Evans 1(b), 854 P.2d at 1282. Moreover, the Supreme Court never
rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of the three main United States
Supreme Court cases that the Colorado court used: Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969), Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971), and Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). This implicitly suggests either that (I) the Supreme Court
agreed with the interpretation generally, but did not agree with it for this particular case,
or (2) the Supreme Court rejected the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation and
applied its own. In either case, the Court never clearly stated its rationale and left open
the door for speculation and extrapolation. But see Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1301
(Erickson, J., dissenting). Justice Erickson, the lone dissenter on the Colorado Supreme
Court, disagreed with the Colorado Supreme Court by suggesting that the majority
exercise caution in how it assessed "new fundamental rights" that, in his opinion, the
United States Supreme Court had not yet recognized. Id. (Erickson, J., dissenting).
Justice Erickson wrote:
At some point in the future, the Supreme Court may agree with the majority's
underlying legal premise and identify such an expansive fundamental right to
participate equally in the political process. Such a substantive due process
decision would most likely conduct an analysis similar to previous Supreme
Court decisions and address the importance of the right, relevant
Constitutional provisions, the history and traditions of our country, and
whether the right is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. The fact that
such analysis is not present in the Supreme Court precedent cited by the
majority cautions against the recognition of such a fundamental right.
Evans l(b), 854 P.2d at 1301 (Erickson, J., dissenting). By following this logic, the
Court could have announced a strong decision, and done so while still avoiding
expressly establishing homosexuals as a suspect class, something that the Court
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B. The Suspect or Quasi-Suspect ClassAnalysis:
A Definitive Conclusion, but Politicallyand Socially Distasteful
Just as the Court avoided explicitly establishing a fundamental right
to participate in the political process, it likewise avoided defining
homosexuals as a suspect class.3 5 Moreover, the Romer III Court
356
sent a mixed signal by applying the traditionally weak rational basis
test in such a stringent manner, yet, at the same time, refusing to
expressly advance gay rights.35 7 Perhaps the Court believed that
Congress designed the Equal Protection Clause to eliminate racial
discrimination 358 and "'only those classifications that are like race in
some relevant sense can responsibly be accorded similar
treatment.' ' 359 The Petitioners also contended that the Court should
apparently wants to do. See Kenton, supra note 114, at 888-89 (illustrating the Court's
reluctance to examine the issue of homosexuals as a suspect class).
355. See Romer !!!, 116 S. Ct. at 1626-29.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 76-85 for an explanation of the rational
basis standard. See generally Marcia Coyle, Court: 'Animus' in Colo. Gay Law, NAT'L
L.J., June 3, 1996, at All (noting that Romer may reinvigorate the rational basis
standard for scrutiny).
357. The Court applied a rational relations test to Amendment 2. Romer II1, 116 S.
Ct. at 1627. By applying the traditional test, the Court did not alter homosexuals'
standing in regard to suspect class analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 113-76
for an examination of the legal system's traditional treatment of gay rights cases.
However, with this decision, the Court unequivocally established that Amendment 2
violated the Constitution. Id. at 1629. Thus, the Court seemingly upheld the
constitutionality of gay-rights legislation (unless a state can demonstrate that an Act
similar to Amendment 2 possesses a rational relation to a legitimate state interest), but
apparently chose not to make any other explicit decisions regarding gay rights. Id. at
1627.
358. See Duncan & Young, supra note 69, at 101 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873)).
359. Id. (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 149 (1980) to demonstrate that the Supreme Court viewed race as the main
requirement for suspect class treatment). In addition, many anti-gay advocates harbor
the notion that the Equal Protection Clause should only act against race-related
classifications. See, for example, Margaret M. Russell, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Rights and "The Civil Rights Agenda," I AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 33, 47-48 (1994),
containing a discussion of a video entitled The Gay Agenda. In the video, David
Llewellyn, president of the Western Center for Law and Religious Freedom, sets forth the
proposition that gays fail to constitute a legitimate minority deserving of protection.
Id. at 48. Instead, according to Llewellyn, homosexuals consist of privileged and
powerful people with far more money and opportunities than either racial minorities or
poor whites. Id.
Some chilling examples of behavior since Amendment 2's passage have arisen and
include the following: A women's book store in Denver received a number of
anonymous phone threats, including, "you queer dyke bitches!" Ned Zeman & Michael
Meyer, No 'Special Rights'for Gays, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 23, 1992, at 32. A person called
into the Denver Gay and Lesbian Community Center with a bomb threat, "We're going
to blow up your f
building." Id. Someone vandalized a classroom in the Denver
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have ignored any argument in favor of homosexuals as a suspect class
since they failed to meet the traditional suspect class requirements. 336"
However, even though the Court refuted the Petitioner's argument, '
it did not suggest that homosexuals should receive suspect status, but
rather, merely noted that Amendment 2 did not rationally relate to a
valid state interest.3 62 Essentially, the majority tip-toed around the
suspect class issue by constantly suggesting that Amendment 2
withholds special protections from a particular, named group.3 63
Further, the Court neglected to discuss its refusal to explore the
suspect class analysis, 364 even though it applied the rational relations
test in an almost strict scrutiny fashion.3 65 As a result, the lower

Center for Performing Arts and scrawled on the blackboard, "FAGGOTS GET OUT OF
THE ARTS." Id. Moreover, vandals knocked a Colorado Springs psychotherapist
unconscious after she placed a bumper sticker on her car that read "Celebrate Diversity,"
and they then spray painted her office with the words "Stop Evil" and "Seek God." Paul
McEnroe, Violence is Apparent Fallout of Colorado Law on Gays, STAR TRIB., Jan. 25,
1993, at IA.
360. Petitioner's Brief, Romer v. Evans, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026, at *16.
But see Russell, supra note 359, at 49. Russell chastised the State's argument
characterizing gay, lesbian and bisexual rights as non-comparable to traditional
minority and women right's issues and therefore inferior. Id. In this vein, Russell,
commenting on the trial court in Evans l(b), suggested that "the trial court might have
rejected the "factionalism" argument ... by stating unequivocally that the eradication of
sexual-orientation discrimination-like the elimination of racial bias-is an equality
principle so important that it cannot be bargained away in the legislative/initiative
process, because a majority of voters happen to consider it too 'divisive' and
'political."' Id. at 64.
361. Romer II, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
362. Id.
363. See id. at 1624-28 for an example of how the majority consistently refers to
homosexuals.
364. The Court's reason to ignore this analysis is unclear, but politics possibly
played a large role. Generally, it is true that a Justice who does not feel strongly about
the matter before the Court will acquiesce to the other Justices to later accomplish his or
her own specific goals. See PHILIP J. COOPER, BATTLES ON THE BENCH 153-56 (1995).
According to Cooper, "[e]ven the most petulant person who comes to the Court must
understand certain realities that govern his or her professional and, to some extent,
personal life. First, for most of the things a justice wishes to accomplish, four
additional votes are needed." Id. at 153. In Romer III, therefore, to garner the votes to
strike down Amendment 2, the Court members who felt strongly about the decision
possibly watered down the opinion to appease the various majority Justices and get their
approval, as the Court has done in the past. Id. Thus, the majority opinion may not
have addressed the suspect class issue directly because of this political gamesmanship.
However, since no one save the Court can substantiate such speculation, this is pure
conjecture.
365. See generally Thomas L. Jipping, The Politically, not Judicially, Correct Court,
WASH. TIMES, May 23, 1996, at A17 (suggesting that Justice Kennedy employed a much
higher standard to review Amendment 2 than mere rational relations).
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courts may ultimately alter the homosexual
status question through
3
their own interpretation of Romer III. 1
C. The DissentingOpinion
1. Quick to Condemn, Yet Guilty of the Same
The majority won a battle for gay rights by rejecting an Amendment
that voided gay-rights protections,36 but chose not to identify any
fundamental rights and failed to substantially support its opinion.3 In
contrast, the dissent's argument,369 on its face, resounded powerfully
against the sometimes ambiguous majority decision. 370 Justice Scalia
wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas. 371 This vigorous and clearly focused opinion overshadowed
366. Joan Biskupic, Court Declares Gays Not Legally Different, WASH. POST, May
22, 1996, at Al (noting that later courts will eventually decide Romer's actual effect on
other homosexual issues).
367. Jill Lawrence, Gay Issue Sizzles in the Senate: Kennedy Leads the Charge After
House Ok's Defense of Marriage Act, USA TODAY, July 15, 1996, at A4.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 331-66 for a critique of the majority
opinion.
369. Scholars have always recognized the significance of dissenting opinions. See
generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled
by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Justice Harlan's dissent stated that
the "Constitution . . . neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 559.
This dissent became the springboard for many of the Civil Rights actions. DONALD E.
LIVELY, FORESHADOWS OF THE LAW: SUPREME COURT DISSENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT, at xxi (1992). Specifically, Lively noted that "[b]y the middle of the

twentieth century, as the Court eliminated segregation of public schools and other
contexts, Harlan's originally repudiated notions prevailed." Id.
370. In cases of great proportion, the dissent often serves as a harbinger of the
future. See ALAN BARTH, PROPHETS WITH HONOR 7 (1974). Barth noted that many
dissents merely convey the dissenter's oftentimes "aberrant view arising out of an
individual justice's prejudices-or out of what [Justice] Hughes called
,cantankerousness."' Id. Specifically, Barth cited Justice McReynolds' comment about
a New York milk control board setting milk prices. Id. McReynolds disagreed with the
majority by asserting that "'to adopt such a view, of course, would put an end to liberty
under the Constitution."' Id. Though acknowledging the "folly" in dissents, Barth also
claimed that at times the dissenters illuminated the future "by their discernment and
understanding." Id. at 8. According to Barth, the "[d]issent has played a seminal role in
the functioning of the Supreme Court." Id. See Griswold v. Connecticut., 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (stating that the Constitution never specifically
guaranteed a right to privacy).
371. This fact indicates that Justice Scalia most likely felt strongly about the issue
and probably put forth a great effort to capture the opportunity to write the opinion
since Justices often battle with one another for this honor. See, e.g., Beverly Blair
Cook, Justice Brennan and the Institutionalization of the Dissent Assignment, 79
JUDICATURE 17 (1995). Cook underscored the importance of a dissenting opinion. Id. at
23. A well-written dissent may serve to change the majority opinion and force them to
rethink or defend their current position. Id. Also, politicians involved in the judicial
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the majority in several ways.3 72 The majority did not apply much
substantial precedent,373 nor did it clearly announce a definitive
holding, 374 though the dissent bolstered its cutting argument 375 witha
few Supreme Court decisions.376 However, the dissent never truly
focused on the main issue either.377 For example, while the majority
tip-toed around the suspect-class analysis, 378 the dissent3 79ignored the
equal protection and fundamental rights issues altogether.
Instead of focusing on traditional equal protection/fundamental
rights analyses, the dissent saw fit to argue its own issues. These
arguments ranged from a religious battle,380 to criminalizing
homosexuality,38' to comparing Amendment 2's discriminatory effect

appointment process will look upon the dissents to help alter the Court's doctrine by
substituting a new justice who may share the minority's view to reshape the majority.
Id. Generally, the ranking dissenter (the most senior Justice) will assign the writing and
most often, the assignee will cordially accept. Id. at 22. In many instances, however,
the senior will himself take the most interesting topics. Id. at 21.
Cook recognized Justice Brennan as the Justice who most influenced the
institutionalization of the dissenting opinion. Id. at 17. She noted that Brennan would
try to equitably assign the opinions, but as the ranking member, took many of the best
for himself. Id. at 21. Thus, the fact that Justice Scalia wrote this opinion may suggest
that Justice Scalia had some particular interest in the case.
372. See generally Mona Charen, Gay Rights Ruling Shows Legislative Side of High
Court's Majority, FRESNO BEE, May 28, 1996, at B5. Charen staunchly supported the
dissent and commented that "Justice Scalia ...not only points out the Bowers problem
but goes further to demolish every aspect of the majority opinion." Id.
373. David Wagner, Supreme Court Again Blurs Distinction Between Politics, Law,
CINCINNATI POST, June 27, 1996, at 20A. Wagner claimed that the majority essentially
ignored and failed to establish clear legal precedent decision. Id.
374. See supra Part IV.A; see also supra Part IV.B and infra Part V (discussing the
somewhat ambiguous majority decision).
375. Justice Scalia asserted, "[tioday's opinion has no foundation in American
constitutional law, and barely pretends to." Romer I!!, 116 S.Ct. at 1637 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
376. See id. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) for the cases the dissent employed.
377. See infra text accompanying notes 411-14.
378. See supra text accompanying notes 355-66 for a discussion regarding the
majority's avoidance of the suspect-class issue.
379. See Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ignoring the Equal
Protection issue for the most part).
380. Id. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing Romer III to a "Kulturkampf").
For a comprehensive discussion of the term "Kulturkampf' in the context of today's
political climate and the Romer decision, see Jeremy Rabkin, A Supreme Court in the
Culture Wars, PUB. INT., Sept. I, 1996, at 3.
381. Romer i1, 116 S.Ct. at 1631-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld a criminal statute, to the Romer III case,
which examines a discriminatory Amendment).
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with polygamy statutes.382 Also, the dissent chided the majority for
failing to support its decision with legal precedent 383 and for its "heavy
reliance upon principles of righteousness rather than judicial
holdings"; 384 yet, the dissent only cited distinguishable cases 385 and
382. Id. at 1635-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890), rev'd in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), in which the
Court upheld the criminalization of polygamy, to Amendment 2)).
383. See, e.g., Romer I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia, at the beginning of section II of his argument commented, "I turn next to whether
there was a legitimate rational basis for the substance of the constitutional
amendment-for the prohibition of special protection for homosexuals." Id. at 1631
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He then proceeded to consider the Bowers case in detail as well
as to suggest that Bowers established a rational basis for Amendment 2. Id. at 1631-32
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Scalia offered string cites and brief holdings
from a few other similar cases like Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (1980), and BenShalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (1989), to support his point. Id. at 1632 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
However, Justice Scalia then began his next section by stating that, "[t]he foregoing
suffices to establish what the Court's failure to cite any case remotely in point would
lead one to suspect: No principle set forth in the Constitution, nor even any imagined
by this Court in the past 200 years, prohibits what Colorado has done here." Id. at 1633
(Scalia, J., dissenting). This statement embraces the same error the dissent claimed the
majority made-the statement lacked precedential support. The cases the Justice cited
all related to Bowers and accurately showed that the Constitution may recognize laws
that criminalize homosexuality. Thus, based on this premise, Colorado may have
possessed a rational relation to pass such a law. However, the Court rejected Amendment
2 because it did not find that the State supported the Amendment with a rational state
interest-i.e., the Amendment failed the test. Clearly, in the last 200 years, some
legislation has failed a rational relations test.
In addition, Justice Scalia ignored the fact that little precedent directly on point exists
concerning legislation that discriminates against homosexuals. In other words, Romer
constituted a case of precedent-setting, first-impression for the Supreme Court. See
Batterman, supra note 188, at 979 (noting that Romer III constitutes a case of first
impression for the United States Supreme Court). Therefore little direct precedent
existed on the issue prior to this decision. The other cases Justice Scalia cited, such as
Belier and Ben-Shalom, relate to military policies, not public legislation.
384. Romer II!, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, by
beginning the argument comparing a legal battle to a religious conflict, appears to
recognize much of the rhetoric-filled claims by the conservative Christian organization
CFV. For example, CFV asserted in its campaign propaganda that homosexuals caused
or committed the majority of child molestations. Grauerholz, supra note I, at 848 n.53
(citing Dr. Paul Cameron, Child Molestation and Homosexuality para. 17 (monograph,
Family Research Institute 1993)). But see Associated Press, Study Disputes Claim on
Homosexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at A 14 (discussing a study that concluded
"[olpenly gay adults are no more likely than heterosexual adults to molest children");
see also Charlene L. Smith, Undo Two: An Essay Regarding Colorado's Anti-Lesbian
and Gay Amendment 2, 32 WASHBURN L.J. 367, 372-73 (1993) (discussing statistics
that refute the belief that gay men molest children); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1294, 1996
WL 694235, at *17 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). The Baehr court discussed evidence
presented by the parties that established that the "most important factor in the
development of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing relationship
between the parent and the child." Id. Specifically, the quality of care-giving and the
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meaningless historical references for support.3 86 Thus, the dissent
pinpointed the flaws in the majority's opinion, yet failed to recognize
the shortcomings in its own opinion.387
Justice Scalia extensively relied on Bowers v. Hardwick388 and
Davis v. Beason,389 even though the Court partially overruled Davis in
a later decision.3 90 Justice Scalia used Bowers to demonstrate that
Amendment 2 possessed a legitimate rational relation to protecting a
public interest.39' But, Colorado does not criminalize sodomy 392 and
as Respondent's brief stated:
[E]ven if an interest in preserving traditional sexual morality can
justify state laws that actually regulate sexual conduct, such an
interest cannot justify [Amendment 2's] blanket authorization
of all discrimination against a class of people, even
discrimination in
contexts that are unrelated to sexuality or
393
sexual conduct.
Moreover, a moral precept that serves to disguise antipathy toward one
group cannot justify discrimination even if safeguarding "traditional
sensitivity given to the child constitute the most significant factors in child
development. Id. The parents' sexual orientation, in and of itself, does not indicate
parental fitness. Id.
385. Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J.dissenting). For the most part,
Justice Scalia relied on Evans l(b) and 11(b), Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), rev'd in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
386. See infra text accompanying notes 388-410 for a discussion of the dissent's
history-based argument.
387. Charles Levendosky, Scorn in the Place of Law; Justice Scalia's Dissent
Elevated Spleen Over Constitutional Principle; The Supreme Court and Gay Rights,
BALT. SUN, June 2, 1996, at 6F. Levendosky noted that Scalia's hatred for homosexuals
blinded him to the constitutional principles at hand. Id. According to the author, "He
[Scalia] may be a brilliant scholar, but when he loses and takes it personally, Scalia-thejustice reacts with a narrowing tunnel vision. No light breaks through at the end." Id.
388. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
389. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), rev'd in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
390. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See supra text
accompanying notes 46-54 for a discussion of Brandenburg.
391. Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("If it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct.").
392. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J.,dissenting) ("Colorado not only is one of the 25 States
that have repealed their anti-sodomy laws, but was among the first to do so." (citing
1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 121, § 1)).
393. Respondent's Brief, at *45 n.32, Romer III, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 417786.
But see Charen, supra note 372, at B5 (arguing that the majority improperly ignored
Bowers since the standards of jurisprudence require the Court to distinguish similar cases
with converse holdings).
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morals" constitutes a legitimate purpose.394 If bare antipathy towards a
group justified legislation which discriminated against that group, then
that legislation would virtually render the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause meaningless. 3 " Justice Scalia seemingly ignored
these notions and failed to cite precedent to dispute these ideas.
Instead, he consistently focused on the conduct of homosexuality as
morally bereft. 396 The Court, however, did not examine a law
qualifying homosexuality as scandalous or illicit behavior. 39' Rather,
the Court rejected a law that discriminated against a recognized
group
39
of individuals that the legislation identified through conduct.
Justice Scalia attempted to tie criminal activity to homosexuality by
suggesting that, because the Constitution allows the state to criminalize
such conduct, 399 the Court should substantiate legislation which
negatively demarcates people who engage in it. 400 This logic
394. Respondent's Brief, at *45 n.32, Romer 11, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 417786
(citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447 (1985);
United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). See also JOHN
HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 26-27, 66-67, 92,
160 (Rutgers Univ. Press 1988) (quoting some Americans who characterized Irish,
Catholics and Jews as inherently morally deficient).
395. Respondent's Brief, at *37, Romer 1II, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 417786
(arguing that "if the 'rational basis' test has any content whatsoever, it cannot permit
discrimination solely for discrimination's sake"). But see Bettelheim & Booth, infra
note 441, at Al for University of Colorado law professor Robert Nagel's comment that
the majority wrote a suprisingly blunt and political decision that too curtly dismissed
the moral debate over homosexuality as a non-issue.
396. Romer I11, 116 S. Ct. at 1629-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent noted:
But I had thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensiblemurder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to animals-and could exhibit
even "animus" toward such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at
issue here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral
disapproval that produced centuries-old criminal laws that we held
constitutional in Bowers.
Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
397. The Colorado Supreme Court recognized this and suggested that "[t]he fact that
there is no constitutionally recognized right to engage in homosexual sodomy is
irrelevant." Evans 11(b), 882 P.2d at 1350 (noting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)).
398. See supra note 11 for Colorado Constitutional Amendment 2. Clearly, the
Amendment did not mean to criminalize conduct. As the majority noted:
[W]e cannot accept the view that Amendment 2's prohibition on specific legal
protections does no more than deprive homosexuals of special rights. To the
contrary, the amendment imposes a special disability upon those persons
alone. Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or may
seek without constraint.
Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1626-27.
399. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
400. Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If it is constitutionally
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misidentified the issue.40' Colorado chose not to criminalize such
activity and thus Amendment 2 violated the very tenets of the Equal
Protection Clause. 2 Justice Scalia suggested that one could consider
certain conduct, criminal or otherwise, reprehensible and even exhibit
animus toward it.40 3 Yet, the only type of conduct the dissent
compared to homosexuality, murder, carries a criminal penalty in all
states.40 4
In addition, Justice Scalia's historical references to long-held
traditions concerning homosexuality failed to necessarily impute
validity and merit to those ideas. 4°5 Justice Scalia's allusions to wellchronicled bias and antagonism against homosexuals 4 did not justify
a discriminatory legislative amendment. Merely noting that it has
always been this way 40 7 does not make the belief correct. 40 8 Thus,
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring
homosexual conduct.") (emphasis added)
401. See Levendosky, supra note 387, at 6F, for a characterization of Justice Scalia's
dissent as blind to the constitutional issues due to his dislike for homosexuals.
402. See supra text accompanying note 68 for Amendment XIV of the United States
Constitution. Thus, Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause since it
"withdraws from homosexuals, but no others, specific legal protection from the injuries
caused by discrimination and it forbids reinstatement of these laws and policies." Romer
111, 116 S.Ct. at 1625. Colorado did not criminalize homosexual conduct although the
Constitution allows criminalization of such conduct. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986). Consequently, even in the face of Richardson v. Ramirez,
418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974) (upholding the proposition that a legislature may deny a
convicted felon the right to vote), the legislature in Colorado may not deprive
homosexuals of any rights guaranteed to non-felony citizens.
403. Romer 111, 116 S.Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
404. Id. (Scalia, J.,dissenting).
405. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that the historic
miscegenation laws are unconstitutional); see also James Trosino, Note, American
Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REv. 93
(1993) (comparing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), and miscegenation to samesex marriages and noting how long-held traditions do not always indicate correctness);
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (comparing prohibitions on same-sex
marriage to anti-miscegenation laws); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Supreme Court 1993 Term - Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 94-95
(1994) (comparing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) with Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896) and suggesting Bowers embodied "segregationist" caste
distinctions similar to those applied in Plessy); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL
694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) (showing that gay marriages do not harm a
child's development in contrast to the State's position and historical beliefs).
406. Romer I11,
116 S.Ct. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
407. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Surely that is the only sort of 'animus' at issue
here: moral disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval that
produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional in Bowers."). But
see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting) (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973)), for the proposition that traditional views do
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Justice Scalia criticized the majority for rhetoric and a lack 4of0
precedent. 40 9 Yet, much of his argument employed similar tactics
and, additionally, failed to focus on the actual Equal Protection Clause
issue.
2. Misplaced Fears Concerns Over Amendment 2's Results
Throughout the dissent, Justice Scalia suggested that Amendment 2
merely retracted "special rights" from homosexuals 41 ' and that
homosexuals did not deserve the same protections as other minority
groups.41 2 In his argument, Justice Scalia failed to adequately address
the fact that the majority did not claim that Amendment 2 took away
"special rights," but instead took away rights that every citizen
enjoyed.41 3 In addition, the dissent's steadfast objection to any
not necessarily mean accurate laws).
408. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1954) (noting that
while education for blacks was "non-existent" at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was passed, this does not "resolve the problem" of whether forced segregation of public
schools violates the amendment), overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(holding that a state may provide "separate but equal" accommodations for blacks and
whites without violating the Fourteenth Amendment).
409. See supra note 383 for Justice Scalia's criticism of the majority's failure to cite
precedent to support its argument. See generally Charen, supra note 372, at B5. Charen
contends that the Court legislated the Romer III decision, rather than base its holding on
solid legal principles. Id. Charen also chided the Court for basing its interpretation of
the law on the changing "climate of opinion" instead of maintaining objectivity. Id.
410. See Levendosky, supra note 387, at 6F, for a discussion of Justice Scalia's
failure to use constitutional principles to guide his opinion.
41 1. Romer 111, 116 S. Ct. at 1630 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argues that:
The only denial of equal treatment [the plaintiffs] contend[ ] homosexuals
have suffered is this: They may not obtain preferential treatment without
amending the state constitution. That is to say, the principle underlying the
Court's opinion is that one who is accorded equal treatment under the laws, but
cannot as readily as others obtain preferential treatment under the laws, has
been denied equal protection of the laws.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
412. See id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia discussed the legislative
success homosexuals enjoyed by getting certain Colorado municipalities to enact
protective measures. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). These measures, Justice Scalia noted,
equated moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry. Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
413. See id. at 1625-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Respondent's Brief, Romer
III, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 417786 at *14. The attorneys for the plaintiffs alleged:
Amendment 2 is unique in having such a discriminatory purpose and effect.
Indeed, the State cannot cite a single other constitutional provision which,
like Amendment 2, targets one group of people and excludes this group alone
from obtaining anti-discrimination protection from ordinary legislative,
administrative and judicial forums to which everyone else may freely appeal..
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favorable comparison between traditional minority rights and those
rights that homosexuals attempted to secure detracted from its
contentions.4 4. This argument confused the issue by trying to compare
homosexuals and traditional minorities. Thus, the dissent seemingly
ignored much of the actual Amendment 2 issues and ended up drawing
irrelevant conclusions.
D. Overall Analysis
Romer v. Evans will undoubtedly leave a lasting impression on
homosexual rights jurisprudence in our country.415 Advocates and
critics alike will consistently use as well as misuse the decision to
support their respective positions.41 6 Yet, the Supreme Court's
• ..Amendment 2 is unprecedented in that it insulates against legal control
or review all instances of governmental and private discrimination based on a
particular characteristic, regardless of context or circumstances.
Id.
414. Romer I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1634 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). But see Russell, supra
note 359, at 72-73. Russell identified the relation between struggles against sexism,
racism, and homophobia and the strength that unity between the groups may bring. Id.
Specifically, Russell wrote:
Rather, I offer the example of Amendment Two and the Evans I -Evans Ii
litigation to argue that African-Americans and other groups in the so-called
'traditional' civil rights agenda may need to reclaim the power of analogy
even as we seek to critique and distance ourselves from its excesses. Even as
we seek to prevent others from 'stealing the center', i.e. the anti-racist
commitment, of the civil rights agenda, we would benefit greatly from sharing
that center with others persistently relegated to the periphery - and those
others include the victims not only of racism/white supremacy, but also of
sexism, classism and homophobia.
Such a multi-pronged approach to
formulating a new "civil rights agenda" would involve the hard work of
confronting racism in gay, lesbian and bisexual communities, as well as
homophobia in racially diverse communities - in other words, a concerted
commitment to speaking out about the perhaps ineliminable differences that
may permanently relegate us to different and unique 'categories' in social
relations, in politics, and in legal theory."
Id. at 72.
415. Jerry Zremski, High Court Decision on Homosexuality Doesn't Provide Strict
Civil Rights, BUFFALO NEWS, May 21, 1996, at A3 (stating that gay-rights activists and
conservative Christians agreed that the Court's decision would create profound
implications).
416. See Coyle, supra note 356, at Al 1.Coyle predicted that:
Romer [Il] . . .has implications beyond gay people's lives . . .it will affect
proposals to end education for children of illegal immigrants, as well as
pending cases such as those seeking to prevent the construction of an Islamic
temple in a certain neighborhood ....
'Romer [fil]'s applications are as limitless as the weaknesses of our
legislative bodies.'
Id. (quoting Matthew Coles, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian
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decision did little to establish clear principles regarding the status of
homosexuals. 41 7 For the most part, the Court applied the same test
that the lower courts applied, while invalidating a democratically
elected Amendment as unconstitutional. 8 The problem does not lie
with the decision per se; the problem stems from the majority's lack of
solid or even partial support for its decision.4 '9 The majority correctly
decided that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 420 However, the majority failed to provide
sufficient rationale to support its invalidation of the Amendment.421
The majority should have chosen simply either to make homosexuals a
suspect class 422 or to apply the Colorado Supreme Court's logic and
establish a fundamental4 right
for homosexuals to participate equally in
the political process. 23 Either option would still create much
and Gay Rights Projects).
417. J. Michael Parker, Court Decision on Gay Rights Leaves Many Questions, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, June I, 1996. Parker questions whether the decision
established homosexuals as a protected minority and muses about Romer's effect on gaymarriages. Id. But, Parker quotes Elizabeth Birch, Executive Director of the
Washington, D.C. based Human Rights Campaign, a national gay rights lobby group,
as claiming that "[t]his decision doesn't confer one new right. It creates a more hopeful
climate in which gays and lesbians can advocate for themselves. It embellishes our
claim to equal protection under the law, but it doesn't delineate what that means beyond
Colorado." Id.
418. See Jipping, supra note 365, for a discussion of Justice Kennedy's choice to
ignore the Court's previous rulings that homosexuals do not constitute a legally suspect
class, while issuing a political ruling which treats homosexuals as if they deserve
suspect class protection by redefining critics' opposition to their agenda as nothing but
hatred, prejudice, and bias.
419. David Wagner, Supreme Court Again Blurs Distinction Between Politics, Law,
CIN. POST., June 27, 1996, at 20A. Wagner debated Romer Ill's conclusion and noted
that the holding does not illustrate any legal precedent for cases like Equality
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996),
contrary to the Supreme Court's decision in Equality Foundation, since Romer I//
"doesn't contain any [legal guidance]-just liberal preening culminating in a judicial
fiat." Id.
420. Upholding Equality, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1996, § 1 at 22. The author of
Upholding Equality believed that the Court did not invalidate Amendment 2 to promote
homosexual lifestyles or qualify sexual orientation with race or religion. Id. Rather, the
author claimed, "Romer v. Evans had everything to do with not allowing any state to
single out any one group or class and denying them equal protection under the law." Id.
421. See generally Linda Bowles, What Constitution?,CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1996, §
I, at 27 (commenting that the judiciary branch represents the greatest enemy to
American democratic government since many of the judiciary's decisions seemingly
lack any constitutional basis).
422. See, e.g., Jipping, supra note 365, at A17 (suggesting that "Justice Kennedy
should first have determined whether homosexuals are a legally special class").
423. But see Francis Mancini, Dangerous Ruling on Gay Rights, PROV. J. BULL.,
May 23, 1996, at B6. This article decried the Colorado court's logic as "remarkably
silly." Id.
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controversy and face tremendous scrutiny and protest, but at least the
Court would have avoided the ambiguity this decision will cause.424
V.

IMPACT

Romer v. Evans closely resembles another landmark case in many
respects-Roe v. Wade.4 25 In Roe, the Supreme Court held that a
woman's constitutional right to privacy includes the decision to
terminate her own pregnancy.426 Many individuals vociferously
disagree with the ruling in Roe,427 as many undoubtedly will not
support the decision in Romer 111.428

Fuither, a number of

commentators have taken umbrage with Roe's weakly supported,429
424. See Parker, supra note 417 (page unavailable), for a comment by Caia
Mockaitis, a spokeswoman for Dr. James Dobson's Colorado Springs-based "Focus on
the Family," that the Romer decision may confer a special minority status upon
homosexuals. In contrast, Parker also cited Elizabeth Birch, who characterized
Mockaitis' statement as "silly" and unfounded since, in Birch's opinion, the decision
did little to enhance homosexual rights beyond establishing a prohibition against
legislative actions similar to Amendment 2. Id.
425. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See, for example, Kaplan & Klaidman, supra note 338,
for a direct comparison of Roe and Romer 1II. Roe v. Wade is not herein examined in
great detail, since most of its subject matter exceeds the scope of this Note. For a more
detailed analysis of Roe v. Wade, see Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1433 (1995) (reviewing DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994)); Margaret G. Farrell,
Revisiting Roe v. Wade: Substance and Process in the Abortion Debate, 68 IND. L.J.
269 (1993); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Abortion, Privacy and State Constitutional Law: A
Speculation if (or when) Roe v. Wade is Overturned, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L.
173 (1989); Arnold H. Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should be Overruled, 67 N.C. L. REV.
939 (1989); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
426. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
427. Loewy, supra note 425, at 939 (arguing that "Roe v. Wade, however, is not
simply wrong; it is Wrong in a fundamental way that few, if any, recent decisions of the
Supreme Court can match").
428. Kim A. Lawton, Clinton Signs Law Backing Heterosexual Marriage,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Oct. 28, 1996, at 80 (quoting Family Research Council Director of
Cultural Studies, Robert Knight as saying, "[i]f you are a devout Christian, Jew, or
Muslim, or merely someone who believes homosexuality is immoral and harmful, and
the law declares homosexuality a protected status, then your personal beliefs are now
outside civil law"). See also Steve Rabey, Court Strikes Down Homosexual Rights Ban,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June 17, 1996, at 68. Rabey quoted Will Perkins, CFV director, as
stating that "'[t]his decision ... represents a body blow against freedom of belief and
freedom of association."' Id. According to Rabey, Perkins feared the decision will have
"far-reaching cultural consequences, hurting the nation's children, setting back the
campaign to preserve traditional family values, and opening the door for a flood of prohomosexual legal attacks which homosexual extremists will now initiate." Id.
429. See generally Kaplan & Klaidman, supra note 338, at 24, for a comparison
accusing the Court's Romer III and Roe decisions of failing to offer clear and convincing
constitutional support for their ultimate conclusions. Id. The authors noted that "Roe's
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yet far-reaching conclusion.43 ° Ultimately, as happened with Roe,
future litigation will define the boundaries of the Romer III decision
and its effects on homosexual rights.43'
Constitutional scholars have suggested that Romer v. Evans
possesses great potential as a building-block case for future
homosexual rights litigation 32 and may eventually be tantamount to
Brown v. Board of Education433 or Roe v. Wade.4 34 Even though the
435
recent congressional vote in favor of the Defense of Marriage Act
emphasized a negative attitude toward gay marriages, 436 homosexual
rights advocates experienced somewhat of an affirmation with the
recent findings of fact in Baehr v. Miike437 and the close Senate vote
flawed reasoning wounded the high court's prestige for a generation" and Romer III may
do the same. Id. at 30.
430. Farrell, supra note 425, at 272-73 (commenting that "Roe . . . neither settled
the national dispute about abortion nor provided instruction on the proper role of the
courts .... Instead, the decision only seemed to fuel the acrimony between pro-life and
pro-choice advocates . . . ."). See also Loewy, supra note 425, at 939 (arguing "[t]he
unique Wrongness of Roe lies in its utter lack of support from any source that is
legitimate for constitutional interpretation ....").
43 I. See Lawton, supra note 428, at 80. For example, legal scholar, Hadley Arkes, a
Professor of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Amherst College, believes the
Supreme Court's decision will greatly affect the future of homosexual marriages: "With
this move, the Court may have armed federal judges to tie up any legislation in a state
that refused to honor homosexual marriages." Id. (quoting Arkes).
432. Loyola University Chicago School of Law professor and constitutional scholar
Diane Geraghty suggested that Romer III represents a case that future gay-rights
advocates will use to support pro-gay-rights arguments. (Interview on file with author).
433. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
434. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
435. Defense of Marriage Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996). The text reads as
follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between
persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such
other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from
such relationship.
Id. See also Lawton, supra note 428, at 80 (noting that Congress created the Defense of
Marriage Act as a defensive measure to slow what pro-family activists fear as the
growing social and legal legitimacy of same-sex marriages).
436. The Defense of Marriage Act came on the heels of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993). In Baehr, the court held that sex constituted a suspect classification under
the Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 67. Thus, the court held that the state statute prohibiting
same sex marriages was presumed unconstitutional unless the state could show that the
classification was justified by compelling state interests, and that the statute was
narrowly tailored. Id. However, the Defense of Marriage Act recognized the states'
rights to choose whether to recognize same sex marriages. Defense of Marriage Act § 2.
437. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). In Baehr, the
defendants denied the plaintiffs' application for marriage licenses solely on the grounds
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on the Employment Non-DiscriminationAct. 438 In light of this good
fortune,439 the Romer III decision, despite exhibiting shortcomings
that may tarnish its ultimate strength, will likely support other
decisions that reflect positively for gay-rights on similar topics." 0 The

that the couples were the same sex. Id. at *1. The plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration
that § 572-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes unconstitutionally denied same-sex couples
marriage licenses. Id. Under a directive from the Hawaii Supreme Court, the defendant
bore the burden of proof. Id. at *3. Defense counsel acknowledged its burden of proof
and stated that "[tihe State . . . has a compelling interest in promoting the optimal
development of children . . . . It is the State['s] policy to pursue the optimal
development of children, to unite children with their mothers and fathers, and to have
mothers and fathers take responsibility for their children." Id.
The district court found that the defendants presented insufficient evidence and failed to
establish the existence of any adverse consequences to the public resulting from samesex marriages. Id. at *16. According to the court, the defendants also failed to "prove
the legal significance of the institution of traditional marriage and the need to protect
traditional marriage as a fundamental structure in society." Id. at *17. Moreover, the
court found that a parent's sexual orientation does not necessarily, by itself, indicate
parental fitness. Id. Specifically, the court held that the defendants "failed to establish a
causal link between the allowance of same-sex marriages and adverse effects upon the
optimal development of children." Id. at *18. The court thus found that the defendants
failed to establish that same-sex marriages will adversely affect "public interest in the
well-being of children and families, or the optimal development of children." Id.
Finally, the District Court ruled, "as a matter of law, that [the] Defendant has failed to
sustain his burden to overcome the presumption that [the Hawaii statute] is
unconstitutional by demonstrating or proving that the statute furthers a compelling
state interest." Id. at *21.
438. Lawton, supra note 428, at 80 (noting that the Employment NonDiscrimination Act, which would have banned workplace discrimination based on sexual
orientation, lost in the Senate in a 50-49 vote).
439. There are indications that homosexuality has gained some recent measure of
support. Former Senator Barry Goldwater called for society to end discrimination
against homosexuals. Lloyd Grove, Barry Goldwater's Left Turn, WASH. POST, July 28,
1994, at Cl. In the federal government, the FBI ended its ban on hiring homosexuals.
Jim Doyle, FBI Agrees to End Policy Against Gays, S.F. CHRON., Dec. il, 1993, at Al.
Even the advertising community realizes the importance of homosexual markets. Steve
Johnson, Targeting the Gay Market Makes Good Business Sense, Advertisers Find,
DENV. POST, Sept. 19, 1993, at D13. Moreover, marketing studies indicate that
homosexuals exceed the national income average. Joya L. Wesley, With $394 Billion
in Buying Power, Gays' Money Talks and CorporateAmerica Increasingly is Listening,
ATL. J. & CONST., Dec. 1, 1991, at F5. Even more recently, people realize that same-sex
marriage would not create harmful problems or confuse children. Katherine Lanpher,
Defense of Marriage Act Passage Comes Too Soon, HOUST. CHRON., Sept. 16, 1996, at
A3.
440. See Kaplan & Klaidman, supra note 338, at 25 for a discussion suggesting that
the Romer III decision does not demonstrate new landmark gay rights, but does create an
apparent sympathetic judicial climate with regard to constitutional claims filed by gays
and lesbians.
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Romer III decision sent a positive signal"' and signified a victory for
opponents of anti-homosexual legislation." '
Generally, the political arena offers limited potential for gay rights
advancements. 4 43 But Romer III appears to indicate the Court's
willingness to defeat legislation which truly discriminates against
homosexuals,444 even if it is unlikely that the Court will classify
homosexuals as a suspect class in the near future." 5 Moreover, in
441. Adriel Bettelheim & Michael Booth, Court Rejects Amend. 2-1992 Law "Born
of Animosity" Toward Gays, DENY. POST, May 21, 1996, at Al (quoting Richard Evans
as saying, "[i]t's a good day; it's a good feeling," while also citing Will Perkins,
chairman of CFV, the original sponsor of the Amendment, as commenting that "[t]oday
is a chilling day").
442. Romer 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1629. Amendment 2, according to the Court,
effectively and arbitrarily took away protections given to homosexuals through local
ordinances. Id. at 1626. The majority commented that a government may not enact
prejudicial legislation without a rational relation to a legitimate state interest and thus
an animosity-driven law may not exist. Id. at 1628. See Rabey, supra note 428, at 70
(quoting Suzanne B. Goldberg, who referred to the decision as the "most important
victory ever for lesbian and gay rights").
443. See Steven A. Holmes, Gay Rights Advocates Brace for Ballot Fights, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, at A17 (noting that "folpponents of gay rights have been
emboldened since voters in Colorado passed an anti-gay rights measure in 1992"); see
also 142 CONG. REC. H7270-71 (daily ed. July I1,1996) (statement of Rep. Mclnnis).
Representative Mclnnis noted:
H.R. 3396, the Defense of Marriage Act, consists of two provisions which
will protect the rights of various States and the Federal Government to make
their own policy determinations as to whether same-sex marriages should be
recognized in their respective jurisdictions. Section 2 of the bill clarifies that
no State need give effect to a marriage recognized by another State if the
marriage involves two persons of the same sex. It does not prevent a State
from giving effect to such a marriage, nor does it prevent a State from making
its own determination for purposes of its State law.
Id. at H7271.
444. Romer II!, 116 S.Ct. at 1629. As evidence of the Court's change in attitude, it
commented:
One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.' Unheeded
then, those words now are understood to state a commitment to the law's
neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. The Equal Protection
Clause enforces this principle and today requires us to hold invalid a provision
of Colorado's Constitution.
Id. at 1623 (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). But see Maggie Gallagher, The People Deprived, ATL. J.& CONST., May
24, 1996, at A23 (stating that the Supreme Court's ruling in Romer III deprived citizens
of Colorado equal access to the law when it nullified the democratically enacted
Amendment 2).
445. Strasser, supra note 71, at 947 (suggesting that the Court seems unwilling to
recognize any new suspect classes and may feel that it identified all the true suspect
classes.) See, e.g., Rethinking Equality, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1996, at A22
(commenting that even though Amendment 2 failed the rational basis test, this does not
automatically imply that the Court may soon endorse gay marriages or overturn the
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addition to Romer III, cases on the near horizon will likely offer
h
favorable precedent for gay rights activists. 446 Thus, amdwt
armed with the
Supreme Court's positive decision in Romer III, gay-rights
proponents will probably move more definitively into the judicial arena
as the place to further their cause.44 7 Consequently, advocates and
lower courts will eventually decide Romer Ills' true significance since
the Court failed to unambiguously pronounce the law regarding
homosexual rights." 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court held in Romer v. Evans that
Colorado's Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 49 The
Court ruled that the Amendment unequally withdrew regular and
ordinary protections that most citizens freely enjoy. 450 Furthermore,
the Court found that the State failed to support Amendment 2 with a
rational relation to a compelling state interest.451
Romer v. Evans represented a turning point in the use of the Equal
Protection Clause to support gay-rights.452 The United States
Supreme Court rejected a state's democratically-approved legislation
because it found that the legislation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.453 The decision
military's "don't ask, don't tell policy," but instead that the Supreme Court suggested
that all Americans should receive equal treatment before the law).
446. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that sex
constitutes a suspect classification under the Hawaii Constitution and therefore a state
statute prohibiting same-sex marriages is presumed to violate the State constitution).
447. Batterman, supra note 188, at 978-79. Batterman surmised:
As the gay community faces the very real prospect of losing these battles in
the legislative arena, the judicial system will likely decide the ultimate issue
of whether gay men and lesbians will be given the opportunity to obtain
access to the same protections that women, Christians, African-Americans,
the handicapped and a host of other diverse groups currently have.
Id.
448. See Coyle, supra note 356, at A 1l,
for the view that Romer III will disempower
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986), and that the decision reinvigorates the rationalbasis standard.
449. Romer I1, 116 S.Ct. at 1629.
450. Id. at 1628.
451. Id. at 1628-29.
452. See Joan Biskupic, Gay Ruling Embraces Civil Rights Premise, WASH. POST,
May 22, 1996, at A4 (quoting Stanford University Law professor Kathleen Sullivan as
forecasting that "[niow governments defending discrimination against gay people have
a higher burden").
453. Romer I1, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
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extended the Equal Protection Clause blanket and affirmed the notion
of equal protection under the law. The Court, however, floundered in
its ultimate attempt to fashion a definitive precedent that advocates and
critics may apply to their individual situations.4" Consequently, even
though there remains little doubt that Romer III created significant
judicial history, 4 " the lower courts will bear the ultimate burden of
fashioning the decision's identity. Courts should continue to
recognize that any amendment which adversely affects an identifiable
group, whether or not the group constitutes a suspect class, may
unconstitutionally infringe upon the group's ability to influence the
political process.
MICAH R. ONIXT

454. See supra Parts IV.A-B.
455. See Zremski, supra note 415, at A3 (noting that "[tihe U.S. Supreme Court
handed gays their greatest legal victory Monday, but the justices stopped short of
granting homosexuals the strict civil-rights protections granted to other minorities").
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